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CLIO ON STEROIDS: HISTORICAL 
SILENCE AS A PRESUMPTION OF 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
 “We must beware of the pitfall of antiquarianism, and must 
remember that for our purposes our only interest in the past is for 
the light it throws upon the present.” – Oliver Wendell Holmes1 
INTRODUCTION  
Since March 23, 2010, political pundits have inundated us with 
rhetoric that either demonizes or defends Congress and the Obama 
Administration’s recent overhaul of the healthcare industry through 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act2 (“PPACA”). Most of 
the debate revolves around section 1501, which requires, with limited 
exceptions, all Americans to purchase and maintain a minimum 
amount of health insurance or pay a penalty.3 Section 1501 has 
become known as the “individual mandate.”4 The breadth of the 
individual mandate, whether couched in Congress’s power to regulate 
commerce5 or to tax and spend for the general welfare,6 is arguably 
unprecedented.7 Indeed, the law’s opponents forcefully assert that it is 
an unprecedented and therefore an unconstitutional expansion of 
federal power.8 Proponents argue that those claims do not withstand 
                                                                                                                  
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474 (1897). 
2 Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
3 Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 242 (2010). 
4 See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 
2010) (“The term ‘Individual Mandate’ in the pleadings and in this opinion refers to the 
minimum coverage provision of the Act which requires that all private citizens maintain 
minimum essential coverage under penalty of federal law.”), aff’d 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011). 
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States ”). 
6 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress the power to “provide for the . . . 
general Welfare of the United States”). 
7 See infra note 403 for a discussion of historical facts that are asserted as precedent for 
the individual mandate.  
8 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Op-Ed, The Insurance Mandate in Peril, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
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scrutiny.9 And the federal government, defending section 1501 in 
court, dismissed the so-called “unprecedented argument” 10 as “empty 
rhetoric, not a legal test.”11  
The government’s pithy dismissal, however, may be equally 
rhetorical. At least some federal judges who have reviewed the 
individual mandate’s constitutionality have been more sympathetic to 
the unprecedented argument. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit, finding the individual mandate beyond 
Congress’s power, noted, “[t]he fact that Congress has never before 
exercised this supposed authority is telling.”12 And Senior United 
                                                                                                                  
 
29, 2010, at A19 (noting that “[s]uch a claim of power is literally unprecedented”); Terence P. 
Jeffrey, A Tyrannical Act, HUMAN EVENTS (Mar. 24, 2010), 
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=36178 (noting the following exchange with 
Senator Orrin Hatch, the senior Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee: “‘If that 
[individual mandate] is held constitutional—for them to be able to tell us we have to purchase 
health insurance—then there is literally nothing that the federal government can't force us to 
do,’ he said. ‘Nothing.’”).  
9 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate for Health 
Insurance, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 482, 483 (2010) (“Although opponents will challenge the 
individual mandate in court, constitutional challenges are unlikely to succeed.”); Judith 
Solomon, Efforts to Nullify Health Reform Likely to Fail, But Could Interfere with Law’s 
Implementation, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 3 (Apr. 7, 2010), 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-7-10health2.pdf (“[A]s Yale law professor Jack M. Balkin has 
pointed out, people who do not buy coverage do engage in economic activity. When uninsured 
people get sick they go to emergency rooms, borrow money from family members, buy over-
the-counter drugs, or engage in other economic activities as a substitute for paying premiums.” 
(footnote omitted)); Richard Cordray & Tom Miller, Why We Won’t File States’ Rights Suits, 
POLITICO (Apr. 2, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/35335.html 
(noting that if the commerce power authorizes Congress to prohibit the home cultivation of 
marijuana, “then surely it authorizes Congress to regulate health care”).  
10 This Note uses the term “unprecedented argument” as shorthand for the argument that 
the novelty or lack of historical precedent for some governmental action means that the Court 
should presume that the action is unconstitutional or, stated simply, the lack-of-precedent-
equals-lack-of-power argument.  
11 Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 33, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t Health 
& Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 3:10–cv–91–RV/EMT), 2010 WL 
3500155.  
12 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1289 (11th Cir. 2011), 
cert. granted 80 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11–393), and 80 U.S.L.W. 3199 
(U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11–398), and cert. granted in part, 80 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 14, 
2011) (No. 11–400); see also Thomas Moore Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 558 (6th Cir. 
2011) (Sutton, J., concurring) (suggesting the individual mandate’s novelty is the “most 
compelling” of the “arguments auditioning to invalidate” it). In the end, Judge Sutton found that 
the petitioner’s facial challenge must fail because the individual mandate was constitutional in 
certain applications. See id. at 565–66 (arguing that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the 
individual mandate is unconstitutional “in all of its applications”). But Judge Sutton recognized, 
citing Printz, the strength of the unprecedented argument. Id. at 559. But see Seven-Sky v. 
Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations and footnotes omitted): 
The Supreme Court occasionally has treated a particular legislative device’s lack of 
historical pedigree as evidence that the device may exceed Congress's constitutional 
bounds. But . . . novelty cuts another way. We are obliged—and this might well be 
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States District Judge Roger Vinson, presiding at the trial of the case 
that the Eleventh Circuit later reviewed, found that while the 
individual mandate’s novelty did “not automatically render it 
unconstitutional, there is perhaps a presumption that it is.”13 This 
historic legal dispute is now before the Supreme Court,14 which will 
ultimately decide the significance of the individual mandate’s 
novelty. 
                                                                                                                  
 
our most important consideration—to presume that acts of Congress are 
constitutional. 
Judge Silberman of the D.C. Circuit recognized the most powerful argument against the 
unprecedented argument, discussed infra in Parts III and IV—congressional actions should be 
presumed constitutional, despite any novelty.  
13 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1164 n.21 
(N.D. Fla. 2010) (ruling on the government’s motion to dismiss). Judge Vinson cited Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907–908 (1997) for that proposition. See id. at 1164 (citing Printz 
v. United States, 521 U.S. at 907–08)); see also infra notes 273–74 and accompanying text 
(discussing this proposition). At the motion to dismiss stage, the individual mandate’s lack of 
historical precedent was alone enough for the plaintiff states’ success. See Florida, 716 F. Supp. 
2d at 1164 (“[A]t this stage of the case, the plaintiffs have most definitely stated a plausible 
claim . . . .”) Subsequently, Judge Vinson concluded that the individual mandate is 
unconstitutional relying, in part, on the lack of historical precedent argument. See Florida v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1284–85 (N.D. Fla. 2011) 
(quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 905, 908) (noting that “an ‘absence of [such] power’ might 
reasonably be inferred where—as here—‘earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive 
power’”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 
1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 80 U.S.L.W. 
3198 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11–393), and cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 14, 
2011) (No. 11–398), and cert. granted in part, 80 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11–
400). Ultimately, based on an interpretation of the Commerce Clause’s original meaning and the 
Supreme Court’s “contracted and expanded” Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Judge Vinson 
held that “because activity is required under the Commerce Clause, the individual mandate 
exceed[ed] Congress’ commerce power.” Id. at 1285, 1295. Commentators have since disagreed 
about the wisdom of Judge Vinson’s lengthy opinion. Compare Randy E. Barnett & Elizabeth 
Price Foley, Op-Ed, The Nuts and Bolts of the ObamaCare Ruling, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2011, at 
A17 (“Judge Vinson's decisive rejection of all these theories is another significant victory for 
individual liberty—the ultimate purpose of federalism—and it lays the intellectual groundwork 
for every decision on the mandate yet to come.”), with Laurence H. Tribe, Op-Ed., On Health 
Care, Justice Will Prevail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2011, at A27 (“There is every reason to believe 
that a strong, nonpartisan majority of justices will do their constitutional duty . . . and treat this 
constitutional challenge for what it is—a political objection in legal garb.”), and Orin Kerr, A 
Comment on District Court Originalism, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (February 1, 2011, 5:35 
PM), http://volokh.com/2011/02/01/a-comment-on-district-court-originalism (discussing Judge 
Vinson’s use of the Commerce Clause’s original meaning and noting that “[g]iven the gap 
between the original meaning of the scope of federal power and the case precedents, I don’t 
think this approach is persuasive for a District Court judge to take”). 
14 See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 80 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 14, 
2011) (No. 11–400) (granting petition for certiorari, limited to the question of whether Congress 
has the power to enact the individual mandate). The Court granted various petitions on various 
questions and ultimately set five and a half hours of argument for four separate issues. See Lyle 
Denniston, Court Sets 5 1/2-Hour Hearing on Health Care, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 14, 2011, 
11:09 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/court-sets-5-12-hour-hearing-on-health-care 
(reviewing and explaining the Court’s various orders). 
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Framed precisely by the health care debate, the issue that this Note 
addresses is whether the lack of historical precedent for a 
governmental action means that the Court should presume that the 
action is unconstitutional. In concrete terms, “[t]he proliferation of 
Government, State and Federal, would amaze the Framers . . . .”15 
During this “breathtaking expansion” 16 of Congress’s power, there 
has been a first time for countless powers, and ever-evolving 
technology will undoubtedly continue the trend. A presumption that 
an unprecedented governmental action is invalid because of its 
novelty thus appears ill advised. The Supreme Court has, however, 
long held that history—of both the Constitution’s original meaning 
and constitutional actors’ practices since the framing—is important.17 
After all, as Judge Posner posits, no legal professional let alone judge 
would simply assert that “[t]his is what the law ought to be today, 
regardless of what it was yesterday, because we have new problems 
and need new solutions.”18  
There is, however, often sharp disagreement about what facts the 
history books reveal and those facts’ applicability to contemporary 
issues.19 The most notorious problem is “law-office” history, a 
                                                                                                                  
15 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 807 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).  
16 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“Due to the emergence of an integrated and industrialized national economy, this 
Court has been required to examine and review a breathtaking expansion of the powers of 
Congress.”).  
17 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (noting “that a 
contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution . . . acquiesced in for a long term of 
years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions” and citing cases in support of this 
proposition); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (noting that “historical 
evidence sheds light . . . on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean [and] 
also on how they thought that” it should be applied); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 
31 (1922) (Holmes, J.) (“If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common 
consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it . . . .”).  
18 Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in 
Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 580 (2000) (internal quotation and 
footnote omitted). Even the landmark privacy case Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965), in which Justice Douglas held “that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance,” invoked historic overtones to support the far-reaching proposition. Id. at 484 
(emphasis added). At the close of the opinion, Justice Douglas noted, “[w]e deal with a right of 
privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school 
system.” Id. at 486.  
19 See, e.g., Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 275 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“It is a familiar adage that history is written by the victors . . . .”); Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 106–07 n.5 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“This Court's opinions 
frequently make assertions of historical fact, but those assertions are not authoritative as to 
history in the same way that our interpretations of laws are authoritative as to them.”). Dueling 
opinions frequently invoke (or ignore) history in general to support each opinion’s respective 
position. That observation, however, is not limited to Justices’ use of historical precedent. For 
instance, in Parents Involved in Community Schools. v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701 (2007), both Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality and Justice Breyer’s dissent claim to be the 
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practice that historian Alfred H. Kelly first described in 1965 as the 
selection of historical facts to support a predetermined outcome 
without regard for context or contradiction.20 The potential for the 
distortion of the past is compounded when meaning is inferred from 
historical silence.21 If the legislature enacts novel legislation designed 
to manage today’s problems, the Court may, despite that novelty, 
“indulge some latitude of interpretation for changing times.”22 Or, 
conversely, the Court could confine the legislature to history’s 
strictures—placing a heavy burden on it—when there is no historical 
precedent for the action.  
The former position is more defensible for at least four reasons. 
First, society evolves and changes over time, making history itself a 
dynamic construct; stated simply, “tradition is a living thing.”23 
Second, the meaning of the past is often ambiguous, which weakens 
history’s authoritativeness over contemporary issues.24 Third, 
concluding that historical silence—which is itself often 
questionable—elicits a negative presumption inescapably involves 
political or policy judgments that frustrate the People’s will.25 And 
lastly, though most importantly, congressional actions—except in rare 
occurrences—are presumed to be constitutional.26 The first two of 
these reasons are based on the position that when history garners 
authority over contemporary issues, it should be accurate. The last 
two are grounded in the philosophy of judicial restraint and deference 
to the country’s public officials who are elected by and for the People, 
the ultimate source of our nation’s sovereignty.  
                                                                                                                  
 
true supporters of the Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). The Chief Justice opines, “[t]his fundamental principle goes back, in this context, to 
Brown itself.” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 143. Meanwhile, the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Breyer admonishes, “[t]o invalidate the plans under review is to threaten the promise of Brown.” 
Id. at 868 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
20 See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP CT. REV. 119, 
122 n.13 ( defining “law-office” history as “the selection of data favorable to the position being 
advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper evaluation of the 
relevance of the data proffered”).  
21 See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the problems with inferring meaning from 
silence.  
22 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring).  
23 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
24 See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the Court’s questionable use of history in Printz). 
25 See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the problems with inferring meaning from 
silence.  
26 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Due respect for the 
decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional 
enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.”). 
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The argument advanced here is narrow. It does not call on the 
Court to ignore history. To the contrary, historical facts are often 
useful and illustrative of a law’s purpose and effect. This Note’s focus 
is confined to the unprecedented or, more specifically, the lack-of-
precedent-equals-lack-of-power argument. Further, as Part IV 
discusses, the lack of historical precedent in certain situations can be 
a factor, albeit a minor one, in the Court’s conclusion that the 
legislature lacks the power for a given action. Most importantly, and 
perhaps most disconcertingly, a general presumption of invalidity 
empowers the Court to invade the province of Congress more 
frequently and fluently, an invasion that is inevitably in tension with a 
free, democratic society.27 Taken to the extreme, it is judicial activism 
running riot.28 
But at the end the twentieth Century, more than 200 years after the 
ink on the Constitution dried, the unprecedented argument assumed 
unprecedented weight in the Court’s decisions.29 This argument was 
                                                                                                                  
27 Cf. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.) (“To 
fight out the wise use of legislative authority in the forum of public opinion and before 
legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such a contest to the judicial arena, serves to 
vindicate the self-confidence of a free people.”), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
28 Cf. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935) 
(Cardozo, J., concurring) (concurring that the National Industrial Recovery Act was 
unconstitutional under the non-delegation doctrine and noting that the code’s grant of power 
was “delegation running riot”). Commentators have argued, and shown through empirical study, 
that on questions of first impression ideology is the guiding light. See Stefanie A. Lindquist & 
Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of 
Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1184 (2005) (noting that “ideology plays a substantial role 
in determining the path of the law via cases of first impression”).  
To some, however, to not sharply review legislative enactments is an “abdication of . . . 
duty.” Ohio Grocers Ass’n v. Levin, 916 N.E.2d 446, 460 (Ohio 2009) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting); 
see also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 10 (1959) (“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than 
to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” 
(quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)). But see Felix Frankfurter, 
John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 219 (1955) (noting that 
Marshall’s decision “is not minimized by suggesting that its reasoning is not impeccable and its 
conclusion, however wise, not inevitable.”); infra notes 106–21 and accompanying text 
(discussing judicial restraint). Though Levin is an Ohio Supreme Court case, Justice Pfeifer’s 
dissent argued generally against a presumption of validity for any legislative enactments. See 
Levin, 916 N.E.2d at 461 (noting that “[t]he bottom line is that courts are the ultimate arbiters of 
what is constitutional, and have been since 1803, and we ought not to be saddled with a 
presumption that restricts our ability to declare a suspect statute unconstitutional.” (citing 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).  
Ultimately, the strength of a challenger’s objection to a statute’s constitutionality 
necessary for any particular judge to vote to strike down the statute is dependent, at least in part, 
on how convinced that judge is about the propriety of judicial review, a power not expressly 
granted to the judiciary. This Note’s position supports—but is not dependent on—a restrained 
approach.  
29 See infra Part II (discussing recent cases that rely on the unprecedented argument to 
support a finding that a congressional action is unconstitutional).  
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most pronounced in the Court’s anti-commandeering decision Printz 
v. United States.30 Justice Scalia, writing for the slim majority, 
painstakingly described the novelty of the federal government’s “use 
of [the] highly attractive power” of commandeering state and local 
executive apparatuses.31 That novelty, Justice Scalia held, “tend[ed] 
to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted [in Printz] 
. . . .”32 Around the same time as Printz, the Court strengthened the 
state sovereign immunity defense in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida33 and Alden v. Maine.34 Both the Alden and Seminole Tribe 
opinions relied on the unprecedented argument to support the 
conclusion that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity 
using its Commerce Clause powers.35 All three of these cases were 
hotly contested 5-4 decisions with sharp disagreement regarding the 
appropriate reading of history.36 Use of the unprecedented argument 
to thwart congressional action was most recently seen in Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,37 
                                                                                                                  
30 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
31 Id. at 905. 
32 Id. at 918. 
33 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
34 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
35 Id. at 743–44 (finding that the Court’s holding was “supported by early congressional 
practice” in which the Court “discovered no instance in which [early Congresses] purported to 
authorize suits against nonconsenting states in these fora”); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 
(pointing out that “the Nation survived for nearly two centuries without the question of the 
existence of such power ever being presented to this Court”). Congress may, however, abrogate 
state sovereign immunity under certain other clauses of the Constitution. See Cent. Va. Cmty. 
Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006) (holding that the Congress’s “power to [exercise a 
preference action] arises from the Bankruptcy Clause itself; the relevant ‘abrogation’ is the one 
effected in the plan of the Convention, not by statute.”); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 
538 U.S. 721, 727 (2003) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)) (“Congress 
may, however, abrogate States’ sovereign immunity through a valid exercise of its § 5 power, 
for ‘the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are 
necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.’”).. 
Whether and how Katz and Seminole Tribe can be reconciled is a question for another 
discussion. Cf. Katz, 546 U.S. at 393 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It would be one thing if the 
majority simply wanted to overrule Seminole Tribe altogether. That would be wrong, but at least 
the terms of our disagreement would be transparent.”).  
36 The conservatives on the Court were in the majority in these cases. The language in the 
Printz opinion is the most draconian. For an argument that Justice Scalia’s decision in Printz 
breaks from his “nationalist leanings” because the “federal government has grown too large and 
its mandates have become too severe for even an ardent Federalist like himself,” see James B. 
Staab, The Tenth Amendment and Justice Scalia’s ‘Split Personality,’ 16 J. L. & POL. 231, 234, 
237 (2000). For a criticism of Justice Scalia’s use of history in Printz, see Gene R. Nichol, 
Justice Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials of an Occasional Originalist, 70 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 953, 963–968 (1999).  
37 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010). More recently, in April of 2011, the Court acknowledged 
the unprecedented argument, but rejected it. See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 
131 S. Ct. 1632, 1641–42 (2011) (holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine’s exception to state 
sovereign immunity permitted an independent state agency to sue a state official to require the 
state official to follow federal law). In Stewart, Justice Scalia, the author of Printz and arguably 
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where a questionable interpretation of the reasoning behind a 1789 
congressional vote factored heavily in the Court’s analysis.38 All 
these decisions not only involved law-office history of the highest 
order, but also centered around what was not said or had not been 
done.  
Part I of this Note addresses the use of history in constitutional 
adjudication generally and elaborates on the problem of law-office 
history. Part II reviews the Court’s use of the unprecedented argument 
to justify its conclusions in Free Enterprise Fund, Seminole Tribe, 
Printz, and Alden. Part III argues that, although the language of those 
cases may support a presumption of invalidity, that presumption is 
unjustified. Part IV proposes two principles—candor and 
consistency—that should guide the Court’s review of novel actions. 
Those principles must be applied with a strong sense of judicial 
restraint. Finally, Part IV concludes that lawyers and judges 
evaluating the individual mandate should shift their attention away 
from the unprecedented question. Whether the government’s past 
actions can be sufficiently analogized to the individual mandate or 
some historical statements can be found suggesting that Congress 
could force citizens to purchase a commodity, thereby making the 
individual mandate “precedented,” should not determine the law’s 
fate. Debating history should be left to historians.39  
I. HISTORY IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
Long ago Justice Holmes admonished that “a page of history is 
worth a volume of logic.”40 Perhaps that aphorism explains the 
Court’s reverence for history in constitutional adjudication. 
                                                                                                                  
 
the originator of the unprecedented argument, found it “a weight[y] objection” but insufficient 
to carry the day. Id. at 1641. Justice Scalia reasoned that though novelty “is often the 
consequence of past constitutional doubts . . .”—an assertion this Note’s purpose is to 
disprove—the situation in Stewart was extremely peculiar and likely had never arisen because 
the conditions necessary for it to arise were likely never present. Id. at 1642. Thus, the 
unprecedented argument carried little weight. Id. This Note argues that the Court should come 
to the same conclusion that it did in Stewart much more often.  
38 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S.Ct. at 3152 (discussing the debate in Congress at the time 
of the creation of the first executive departments regarding which branch had the authority to 
remove executive officers). 
39 Even originalists sometimes concede that the “task [is] sometimes better suited [for] the 
historian than the lawyer.” Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 
849, 856–57 (1989) (“Properly done, the task requires the consideration of an enormous mass of 
material . . . . Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation of the reliability of that material . . . . 
And further still, it requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the 
time . . . . It is, in short, a task sometimes better suited to the historian than the lawyer.”). 
40 N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).  
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Nevertheless, while all judges agree that lessons from the past can be 
a useful tool, the weight attributed to history is rather controversial.41  
The Court has used history since its inception. Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s conclusion in McCulloch v. Maryland42 was that Congress 
had the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to incorporate a 
bank.43 In reaching this decision, Marshall observed that “[t]he 
principle now contested was introduced at a very early period [in] our 
history [and] has been recognised . . . as a law of undoubted 
obligation.”44 But Marshall did not employ the country’s 
“acquiescence” with the act to automatically validate the law.45 
“These observations belong to the cause,” said Marshall, “but they are 
not made under the impression that, were the question entirely new, 
the law would be found irreconcilable with the [C]onstitution.”46  
As a preliminary matter, the question when the Court interprets the 
Constitution is always whether a congressional or executive action is 
“incompatible with, and repugnant to, the constitutional laws of the 
Union.”47 When the Court interprets a statute, the text is always the 
                                                                                                                  
41 A classic example of this tension, discussed by Kelly in Clio and the Court, supra note 
20, is Justice Frankfurter’s concurring and Justice Black’s dissenting opinions in Adamson v. 
California, 332 U.S. 46, 59, 68 (1947). A recent example is an exchange between Justices Scalia 
and Alito in a Supreme Court oral argument that went as follows:  
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I think what Justice Scalia wants to know is what James 
Madison thought about video games. (Laughter) Did he enjoy them?  
JUSTICE SCALIA: No, I want to know what James Madison thought about 
violence. Was there any indication that anybody thought, when the First Amendment 
was adopted, that there—there was an exception to it for—for speech regarding 
violence? Anybody?  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 
2398 (2010) (No. 08–1448). 
42 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  
43 Id. at 424. 
44 Id. at 401. 
45 Marshall used history frequently and is commonly viewed as the technique’s originator. 
See Kelly, supra note 20, at 123 (noting that John Marshall “introduced [the] technique very 
successfully, and the Court has used it ever since”). His method is now employed by justices 
from all camps of constitutional interpretation. See Posner, supra note 18, at 582–583 
(discussing various views on the use of history in constitutional adjudication). Modern justices’ 
assertions are, at best, less accurate than the “walking historical ‘primary source’” that Marshall 
was. Kelly, supra note 20, at 123–24. Kelly calls Marshall’s practice history by “judicial fiat” or 
“authoritative revelation.” Id. at 122. Kelly argues that creation of history by “judicial fiat” 
occurs when the Court simply states the framers’ intentions, without an extended essay into 
other primary sources. Id. at 122–23. This practice then allows later Courts to cite the decision 
rather than the primary source. Id. at 123 (noting that “by quoting history, the Court made 
history, since what it declared history be was frequently more important than what the history 
might actually have been). Since today’s Justices are not “walking primary sources,” they 
typically include an extended essay discussing primary sources. The essay, however, is typically 
of the “law-office” variety.– 
46 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 402. 
47 Id. at 425.  
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beginning of the inquiry and if unambiguous, usually the end as 
well.48 When constitutional texts are interpreted, however, their short 
phrases are almost always colored by the more than 200 years of 
history and doctrine.49 That is so because the nature of a constitution 
“requires[] that only its great outlines should be marked, its important 
objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those 
objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.”50 
“[T]o contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its 
great powers will admit,” said Chief Justice Marshall, “would partake 
of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the 
human mind.”51 Marshall concluded that famous discussion: “[W]e 
must never forget[] that it is a constitution we are expounding.”52  
As Marshall foreshadowed, the short Constitution, compounded 
with the framers’ novel experiment of federalism, creates endless 
questions about its meaning. Because the amendment process is 
difficult and the provisions are, at best, not self-defining, courts must 
expound the Constitution’s text using other interpretive tools.53  
One of those interpretive tools is history.54 The Court’s frequent 
use of history without offering much justification tends to implicitly 
                                                                                                                  
48 See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 397 (1951) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the 
statute means.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997) (discussing the interpretive philosophy of textualism). 
But if unambiguous texts produce “absurd” results, even the most ardent textualist will deviate 
from the unambiguous text to consult other sources such as legislative history. See Green v. 
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I 
think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materials, including the background of Rule 
609(a)(1) and the legislative history of its adoption, to verify that what seems to us an 
unthinkable disposition . . . .”); see also Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 
457, 459 (1892) (“It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet 
not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”). 
49 See SCALIA, supra note 48, at 39 (noting that in Constitutional law case briefs “you will 
rarely find the discussion addressed to the text of the constitutional provision that is at issue”). 
50 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407.  
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
53 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“Because there is no 
constitutional text speaking to this precise question, the answer to the CLEOs' challenge must be 
sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the 
jurisprudence of this Court.”). 
54 For example, in the Court’s infancy, Justice Paterson opined, “To this objection, which 
is of recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under it for a period 
of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible 
answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.” Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 
(1803) (holding that Congress had the power and authority to establish and abolish lower federal 
courts). The objection in Stuart was that Supreme Court Justices, who at that time “rode circuit” 
to hear cases at the lower federal courts, had no right to do so because they were not appointed 
as such. Id. During the 2010 term, the Court, while noting longstanding practice is not 
conclusive, held that “[a] history of involvement . . . can nonetheless be ‘helpful in reviewing 
the substance of a congressional statutory scheme,’ and, in particular, the reasonableness of the 
 4/10/2012 1:40:11 PM 
2011] CLIO ON STEROIDS 533 
legitimize the practice.55 Discussion is nonetheless useful to clarify 
both the reasons behind and justifications for the use of history in 
constitutional law.  
In judicial opinions, historical analysis manifests itself in roughly 
two forms: (1) original meaning (or intent) and (2) the historical 
practices of constitutional actors. This Part’s first section briefly 
touches on the use of original meaning in constitutional interpretation 
and its applicability to the presumption of invalidity. The next section 
discusses the Court’s reliance on the historical practices of 
constitutional actors. The final section canvases the major problem of 
history in law:56 law-office history.57 
A. Constitutional Interpretation, Originalism, and Silent History 
One use of history—in the quest to find meaning in ambiguity—is 
to inform present-day interpreters what the constitutional phrases 
meant when they were written.58 That is the heart of the theory 
advocated in the 1950s and 60s by Justice Hugo Black and today by 
                                                                                                                  
 
relation between the new statute and pre-existing federal interests.” United States v. Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1958 (2010) (citations omitted). Legislative history is also often used in 
statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508–09 
(1989) (“Concluding that the text is ambiguous . . . we then seek guidance from legislative 
history and from the Rules’ overall structure.”). But the history this Note grapples with is not 
only what the framers said or debated about the text to ascertain its purpose, but also that of 
historical practice by the legislature and executive.  
55 See Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 183 (1993) 
(“Tradition has become one of the few sources of authority in constitutional interpretation that 
ostensibly need no justification.” (footnote omitted)). 
56 The problem of law-office history is amplified when the history books are silent. See 
infra Part III.C. 
57 See infra Part I.C (discussing law-office history).  
58 See SCALIA, supra note 48, at 38 (“What I look for in the Constitution is precisely . . . 
the original meaning of the text . . . .”). It is important to note that “the original meaning of the 
text” is different than “what the original draftsmen intended.” Id. Using the framers’ intent is 
inappropriate for constitutional interpretation for a number of reasons. See H. Jefferson Powell, 
Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 664 (1987). Powell argues that not only does using 
intent fail to address the issue of “group intent” (i.e., the many minds that were involved in the 
framing and ratifying), but also that “it asserts rather than proves a highly controversial position 
in the theory of interpretation, namely that ‘meaning’ is equivalent to ‘intent.’ The list of those 
who have rejected [that] position, at least with respect to the Constitution, includes such 
worthies as James Madison, John Marshall, and Oliver Wendell Holmes.” Id. at 663–64 
(footnote omitted). For purposes of this Note, meaning and intent collapse into a single issue: 
the consultation of primary sources that are over two hundred years old to answer a 
contemporary question. Also, it is noteworthy that while the scholarship draws a sharp 
distinction between meaning and intent, see, e.g., id. at 664 (rejecting the position that meaning 
is equivalent to intent), judicial analysis of original meaning often includes a discussion of the 
framers’ intent (most notably James Madison and Alexander Hamilton), as expressed in writings 
contemporaneous with the framing such as the Federalist Papers. See, e.g., Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 905–16 (1997) (analyzing discussions contemporaneous with the framers, 
including several originally published in the Federalist Papers).  
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Justices Scalia and Thomas: originalism.59 Binding judges to the 
text’s original meaning can serve to “prevent the words . . . from 
becoming completely empty containers for whatever meaning with 
which we care to fill them.”60 History is central to the originalists’ 
understanding of the Constitution. Justice Scalia’s intellectual 
presence and candor about his constitutional theory increased the 
Court’s reliance on history, especially in opinions that he wrote, very 
early in his tenure.61  
Originalists believe that “the semantic meaning of the written 
Constitution was fixed at the time of its enactment . . . .”62 Lawrence 
B. Solum denotes that belief—which all originalist theories share—
the “fixation thesis.”63 Though the specifics of originalist theories 
vary,64 the fixation thesis necessitates a historical inquiry.65  
Critics of originalism argue that the amateurish use of history by 
originalist judges breeds activism and is plagued by the problem of 
law-office history.66 The “fixation thesis” of originalism is the most 
                                                                                                                  
59 See generally SCALIA, supra note 48, at 39 (discussing the original meaning theory of 
constitutional interpretation).  
60 Powell, supra note 58, at 696 (noting also that “James Madison . . . thought that 
contemporaneous expositions of the Constitution were of some value in checking unintended 
change resulting from the fluidity of language”). In that way, originalism is consistent with the 
Madisonian view of constitutional interpretation. James Madison, however, likely did not agree 
with the strict fixation thesis of originalism, given his changed view on the constitutionality of a 
national bank. See infra note 75 (discussing Madison’s signing of the bill that chartered the 
Second National Bank despite the fact that as a Congressman he believed a federally chartered 
bank was unconstitutional).  
61 See Brown, supra note 55, at 179–80 (written in 1993 and noting that “Scalia has 
personally authored at least fifty-three opinions that relied expressly on tradition to resolve 
constitutional issues”). 
62 Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 
(2011). 
63 See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 2 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Papers Series No. 07–24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 
(“Almost all originalists agree, explicitly or implicitly, that the meaning (or ‘semantic content’) 
of a given Constitutional provision was fixed at the time the provision was framed and 
ratified.”). 
64 See id. at 18–19 (discussing new originalism, which is generally defined as an inquiry 
in the original public meaning of the Constitution rather than intent of the framers). Compare 
Barnett, supra note 62, at 71 (arguing that while questions of ambiguity can typically be 
answered by the semantic meaning of the text, questions of vagueness cannot) with John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of 
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 774 (2009) 
(disagreeing with Barnett’s distinction and asserting that “[u]nder the original interpretive rules, 
we believe that interpreters were required to select the interpretation of ambiguous and vague 
terms that had the stronger evidence in its favor”). 
65 See Powell, supra note 58, at 660–61 (discussing the turn to history associated with 
originalism).  
66 See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 76 (2010) 
(discussing why the historical approach adopted by originalists “suffers serious problems”); 
Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law-Office History: ‘Meet the New Boss, Same as 
the Old Boss’, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1124–25 (2009) (“Without a mastery of the elementary 
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intensely critiqued.67 One argument against the thesis is that it seems 
contrary to Chief Justice Marshall’s warning that “we must never 
forget[] that it is a constitution we are expounding.”68 McCulloch is 
often cited for the proposition that Congress’s enumerated powers 
should be given a broad construction.69 Accompanied by the notion 
that the Constitution was “intended to endure for ages to come,”70 the 
“‘open-ended’ clauses of the Constitution” are in tension with the 
notion that the text represents an original and identifiable meaning.71  
Another objection to originalism is that the theory relies on the 
questionable assumption that there is one objective reading of 
history.72 If an originalist concedes that the interpretation of history is 
partially subjective, the theory—when presented as one of 
restraint73—breaks down. In A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Scalia 
                                                                                                                  
 
techniques of historical research, and without some grounding in the relevant historiography of 
early American history, the new originalism will continue to be little more than a rebranded 
version of the old law office history.”); see also Martin S. Flaherty, History ‘Lite’ in Modern 
American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 526 (1995) (noting that history in law “at 
times fall[s] below even the standards of undergraduate history writing”). For a piece which is 
less a critique of originalism and more a parody on constitutional interpretation—or the 
development of new theories at least—itself, see generally Anonymous, Our Boggling 
Constitution; or, Taking Text Really, Really Seriously, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 651 (2010).  
67 Perhaps the most pithy rejection of originalism was written by Justice Jackson, 
concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952): 
“Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern 
conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called 
upon to interpret for Pharaoh.” Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
68 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).  
69 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the ‘Great’ Marshall Court Decisions?, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1126 (2001) (noting that “[a]fter McCulloch, it was difficult to imagine a 
politically plausible congressional exercise of power that would exceed constitutional 
limitations”). 
70 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415. 
71 See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1085, 1092 (1989) (noting that one “argument against originalism . . . is that the Framers 
anticipated that the courts would defend human rights beyond those expressly listed in the Bill 
of Rights”).  
72 Cf. Farber, supra note 71, at 1095 (“The difficulties of this historical inquiry are 
obvious, since the framers are unlikely to have discussed the precise balance between general 
principles and specific examples.”); Geoffrey Schotter, Note, Diachronic Constitutionalism: A 
Remedy for the Court’s Originalist Fixation, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1241, 1277 (2010) 
(noting that the “liberties” Justice Scalia took in District of Columbia v. Heller interpreting the 
Second Amendment’s history “illustrate dramatically the subjectivity and discretion inherent in 
the originalist search for synchronic meaning”); see also PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM 
415 (1988) (discussing objectivity in the history profession).  
73 The originalist movement gained popularity in the 1980s as an attempt to cabin what 
proponents such as Raoul Berger and Robert Bork saw as judicial activism to the nth degree. 
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143 (1990) (“In truth, only the approach of 
original understanding meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must 
meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy.”); Raoul Berger, ‘Original Intention’ in 
Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296, 297 (1986) (noting Berger’s concern “with 
judicial revision of the Fourteenth Amendment”). More recent commentators, however, argue 
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criticized theories that are not faithful to the Constitution’s original 
meaning: 
[I]t is known and understood that if th[e] logic [of existing 
case law] fails to produce what in the view of the current 
Supreme Court is the desirable result for the case at hand, 
then, like good common-law judges, the Court will 
distinguish its precedents, or narrow them, or if all else fails 
overrule them, in order that the Constitution might mean what 
it ought to mean.74  
Scalia’s argument relies on a thin distinction between 
distinguishing case law (i.e., common law method) and distinguishing 
among competing historical facts (i.e., originalism). Often “[a] 
century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields 
no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from 
respected sources on each side of any question. They largely cancel 
each other.”75 If an originalist judge chooses sides in a historical 
partisan debate—and in doing so strikes down an act of Congress—he 
or she is just as guilty as any other activist judge, for example, one 
who prefers to reference the Constitution’s penumbras and 
emanations to decide the controversy at bar.  
Though history is and should be important, when originalist judges 
elevate ambiguous history76 to a level of authority second only to the 
Constitution’s short phrases, the problem of law-office history shines 
with unparalleled light.77 The scholarship in this area is as vast as the 
                                                                                                                  
 
that originalism “does not require judges to get out of the way of legislatures. It requires judges 
to uphold the original Constitution—nothing more, but also nothing less.” Keith E. Whittington, 
The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004).  
74 SCALIA, supra note 48, at 39. 
75 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634–35 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
76 See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, Address to the Federal Bar Association, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 15, 19–20 (1985) (discussing, in response to Attorney General Meese’s comments on 
originalism, the problem of ambiguities in the historical record such as the fact that James 
Madison the Congressman believed a federally chartered bank was unconstitutional but James 
Madison the President signed the bill that charted the Second National Bank). 
77 As H. Jefferson Powell noted:  
If the founders, as you understand them, always agree with you, it is logically 
possible that you are in incredible harmony with them. It is considerably more likely 
that your reconstruction of their views is being systematically warped by your 
personal opinions on constitutional construction. . . . Justices Hugo Black and 
William Rehnquist . . . have been equally consistent in their claims that the founders’ 
views coincided with their own, despite historical evidence to the contrary.  
Powell, supra note 58, at 677. 
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arguments are intricate.78 This Note does not need to resolve 
arguments about the writtenness of and fidelity to the Constitution. It 
suffices to say that the originalist method is predisposed to be 
attracted to the presumption of invalidity.  
Other methods of constitutional interpretation are less amenable to 
the presumption of invalidity. One such theory, espoused by Justice 
Robert H. Jackson, is pragmatism.79 Though a definition of 
pragmatism is somewhat elusive, a pragmatic judge, mindful of 
judicial restraint, attempts to arrive at the best result both in the 
present case and the future.80 The pragmatic judge may use history as 
one interpretive tool but is certainly not bound by it.81 Pragmatism, as 
advanced by Justice Jackson, is a direct rejection of originalist 
principles.82  
Another theory less amenable to the presumption of invalidity is 
the concept of “active liberty,” advanced by Justice Breyer in his 
recent books concerning constitutional interpretation.83 Justice Breyer 
defines the concept of active liberty as “a sharing of a nation’s 
sovereign authority among its people.”84 The philosophy that Justice 
Breyer advocates seeks to be consistent with the “people’s will,” 
which includes longstanding historical precedent.85 Indeed, “a deep-
seated conviction on the part of the people . . . is entitled to great 
                                                                                                                  
78 See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (noting 
that since Farber’s article “the literature [on originalism] has grown many times larger, fueled 
both by the emergence of powerful new scholarly defenders of originalism and by the fact that 
the current composition of the Supreme Court, most notably Justices Scalia and Thomas, gives 
originalist arguments a ready and important audience”). 
79 See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) 
(discussing the vagueness of the theory and the Justices who have been called pragmatists).  
80 See id. at 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (adopting, as a definition of 
a pragmatist judge, “[a] judge [who] always tries to do the best he can do for the present and the 
future . . . ”).  
81 Judge Posner described a pragmatic approach to history:  
The study of other laws, or of world public opinion as crystallized in foreign law and 
practices, is a more profitable inquiry than trying to find some bit of eighteenth-
century evidence that maybe the framers of the Constitution wanted courts to make 
sure punishments prescribed by statute were proportional to the gravity, or difficulty 
of apprehension, or profitability, or some other relevant characteristic of the crime. If 
I found such evidence I would think it a valuable bone to toss to a positivist or 
formalist colleague but I would not be embarrassed by its absence because I would 
not think myself duty-bound to maintain consistency with past decisions. 
Id. at 13–14.  
82 See supra note 67 for Justice Jackson’s rejection of originalism.  
83 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 32 (2008); BREYER, supra note 66, at 80. 
According to Judge Posner, Breyer is also sometimes labeled a pragmatist. See Posner, supra 
note 79, at 2 (adding Breyer to the list of Supreme Court Justices who have been called 
pragmatists).  
84 BREYER, supra note 83, at 25–26. 
85 Id. at 111.  
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respect.”86 A long-standing conviction, however, is not the end of the 
matter, and Justice Breyer’s philosophy looks also at the present 
consequences of the decision.87  
The methodology and merits of these three interpretive theories is 
not at issue here. Rather, they illustrate that particular judges’ 
receptiveness to the presumption of invalidity varies with the 
authoritativeness that the judge allots to history.  
B. Historical Practices of Constitutional Actors 
The type of history discussed above is the use of the Constitution’s 
historic meaning to decide present controversies. A particular judge’s 
opinion of the authoritativeness of the original meaning of the 
Constitution determines, in part, his or her responsiveness to the 
presumption of invalidity for novel actions.88 The second type of 
history often considered in judicial opinions is the historical practices 
of constitutional actors. The justification used for past historical 
practice is somewhat different from that of original meaning. 
Historical practice tends to show constitutionality or 
unconstitutionality based on the experiences of constitutional actors. 
The relevance of this historical practice theory to this Note’s thesis 
lies in the reasoning why historical practice is important: (1) the claim 
and acquiescence, or reliance, theory; (2) judicial restraint, which 
requires deference to coordinate branch’s actions; and (3) for general 
lessons learned or rhetorical flair. Particularly, the theory of judicial 
restraint contradicts the presumption of invalidity for novel actions. 
This section discusses each justification in turn.  
1. Claim and Acquiescence 
The claim and acquiescence theory holds that longstanding 
congressional (or executive) practice suggests that such practice is 
consistent with the Constitution.89 If an action has been acquiesced in 
                                                                                                                  
86 Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903) (Holmes, J.), quoted in BREYER, supra note 
83, at 108.  
87 See BREYER, supra note 83, at 114 (noting that “consequences may decide a case in a 
way that radically changes the law. But this is not always a bad thing.”).  
88 Cf. Berman, supra note 78, at 21–22 (discussing the differences between strong and 
weak originalism and that strong originalism contemplates “that original meaning either is the 
only proper target of judicial constitutional interpretation or that it has at least lexical priority 
over any other candidate meanings the text might bear”). 
89 See, e.g., Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922) (Holmes, J.) (discussing 
“common consent”); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (noting the established 
principle that legislation laid down at the time of the framing and “acquiesced in for a long term 
of years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions” and citing cases in support of this 
principle); cf. Holmes, supra note 1, at 476 (“Sometimes it is said that, if a man neglects to 
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for a number of years, common consent tends to show that the action 
is constitutional. “[N]o one acquires a vested or protected right in 
violation of the Constitution by long use,” but such use “is not 
something to be lightly cast aside.”90 In Walz v. Tax Commissioner,91 
a New York City property tax exemption for churches was challenged 
under the Establishment Clause,92 a jurisprudence that relies heavily 
on history.93 The Court found it significant that “Congress, from its 
earliest days,” had viewed statutory real estate tax exemptions for 
religious bodies as valid.94 The nature of the Establishment Clause 
justified the Court’s reliance on two centuries of uninterrupted 
practice. The Court noted that the pre-Revolution practice has never 
“given the remotest sign of leading to an established church or 
religion . . . .”95 The historical practice shed light on the precise 
question presented: has government sponsored or favored any 
religion?  
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the Steel Seizure Case,96 
discussed a position similar to the reliance theory in Walz. At issue 
was President Truman’s power to seize the steel mills without 
congressional authorization to avert a shutdown during the Korean 
War.97 Justice Frankfurter, concurring with the majority’s conclusion 
that Truman did not possess seizure power, nonetheless noted that:  
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to 
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, 
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the 
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of 
the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on 
“executive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.98  
                                                                                                                  
 
enforce his rights, he cannot complain if, after a while, the law follows his example.”). 
90 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970). 
91 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
92 Id. at 667. 
93 See generally Garrett Coyle, Note, The Role of Tradition in Establishment Clause 
Jurisprudence, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137 (2009) (discussing the use of history in the 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence).  
94 Walz, 397 U.S. at 677.  
95 Id. at 678. The Chief Justice was responding to lone dissenter Justice Douglas’s 
contention that the exemption is a “long step down the Establishment path.” Id. at 716 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting). See infra notes 130–32 and accompanying text for Justice Douglas’s argument 
dissenting in Walz.  
96 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
97 Id. at 583 (majority opinion).  
98 Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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If presidents from Washington through Truman had consistently 
used the seizure power without congressional authorization, under 
Frankfurter’s reasoning, the case would have come out differently.99 
By that logic, Congress’s inactivity could erode its powers. 
Frankfurter’s reasoning appears to be similar to Justice Scalia’s 
“unprecedented” argument in Printz.100 But the reliance theory is 
actually more defensible because it involves one branch of 
government’s long acquiescence in another’s actions rather than a 
general negative inference about the meaning of inaction. This theory 
is considered more fully in Part IV infra.  
2. Judicial Restraint 
In 1788, Alexander Hamilton referred to the judiciary as the “least 
dangerous” branch of the proposed government.101 Later, James 
Bradley Thayer, and after him Alexander M. Bickel, would marvel at 
how the judicial “power to declare legislative Acts unconstitutional, 
and to treat them as null, c[a]me about.”102 This remarkable, and anti-
majoritarian, power was not explicitly granted by Article III.103 The 
story of how Chief Justice John Marshall, despite what today would 
be a definite conflict of interest, established the power of judicial 
review need not be elaborated here. At a minimum, Marshall’s 
argument in Marbury v. Madison104 was not his best work.105 
Marshall himself was willing to consider bargaining the doctrine 
away “for security in the judicial office” during Justice Samuel 
Chase’s impeachment.106  
                                                                                                                  
99 There were in fact instances of past Presidents acting as if they possessed an inherent 
seizure power, such as President Wilson’s seizure of Smith & Wesson during World War One. 
Id. at 612 n.20. Frankfurter distinguished the past occurrences to find President Truman 
overstepped his bounds. Id. at 613 (finding that these previous occurrences “do not add up, 
either in number, scope, duration or contemporaneous legal justification” to other situations in 
which presidents used this alleged power). A recent book about the Roosevelt Court, of which 
Frankfurter was a part, noted that Frankfurter’s position—i.e., finding against Truman where 
there he easily could have cited past precedent that would have been consistent with his test—
“reflected [his] contempt for Truman.” NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS 359 (2010).  
100 See infra Part II.B (discussing the unprecedented argument as used in Supreme Court 
cases dealing with issues of federalism). 
101 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
102 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1893); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 1 (2d ed. 1986) (“The least dangerous branch of the American government is the most 
extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known.”).  
103 See BICKEL, supra note 102, at 1 (noting that judicial review “does not derive from any 
explicit constitutional command”).  
104 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
105 See BICKEL, supra note 102, at 3–10 (discussing the weaknesses of Marshall’s 
reasoning in Marbury). 
106 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 28 (Octagon Books 
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The power to declare acts of the federal government 
unconstitutional is likely not necessary for the union’s perpetuation, 
acknowledged Justice Holmes: “I do not think that the United States 
would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of 
Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could 
not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.”107 The 
Court should exercise this incredible power108—not explicit in the 
Constitution and not necessary for the continuance of the union—with 
a due respect for the will of the People, a will personified in their 
elected officials.109  
Perhaps the last great champion of judicial restraint was Justice 
Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter promoted the principle originally to 
counter the Lochner Court’s vested property rights conception of the 
Due Process Clause and severely limited vision of Congress’s 
commerce power, which was consistent with his political 
philosophy.110 The vested property rights doctrine frustrated 
progressive reforms with which a majority of Americans agreed at the 
state level while the tortured construction of the commerce power 
frustrated similar reforms at the federal level. Frankfurter, however, 
consistently applied his theory regardless of the legislative policy at 
issue.111  
                                                                                                                  
 
1979). 
107 Id. at 16 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED 
LEGAL PAPERS 295–6 (1920)).  
108 Congress and the President do, however, have certain pressure points, exhibited most 
dramatically in the Court Fight over the New Deal. See JACKSON, supra note 106 passim for a 
discussion of the Court Fight.  
109 The difficulty posed is that when the Court voids a congressional or executive action 
the practice is “counter-majoritarian.” See BICKEL, supra note 102, at 16–17 (“[W]hen the 
Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it 
thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now . . . .”).  
110 See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 
HARV. L. REV. 353, 372 (1916) (discussing the Court’s decision in Lochner and noting that 
“[f]undamental is the need that the profession realize the true nature of the issues involved in 
these constitutional questions and the limited scope of the reviewing power of the courts.”). 
111 Dissenting in the second flag salute case, which held that a school cannot expel students 
for refusing to salute the American Flag, Frankfurter declared:  
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is not likely 
to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my purely 
personal attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate myself with the general 
libertarian views in the Court’s opinion, representing as they do the thought and 
action of a lifetime. But as judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic 
nor agnostic. We owe equal attachment to the Constitution and are equally bound by 
our judicial obligations whether we derive our citizenship from the earliest or the 
latest immigrants to these shores. 
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646–47 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). Barnette overruled Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940), 
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Judicial restraint requires deference to legislative and 
administrative actions.112 The principle, iterated by the Court in 1827, 
is that “a decent respect [is] due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the 
patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to 
presume in favour of its validity, until its violation of the constitution 
is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.”113 In addition to the counter-
majoritarian difficulty, another reason that deference is appropriate is 
the “oath of office” theory.114 Under Article VI of the Constitution, 
any public official whose duty involves a lawmaking or interpretive 
function “shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support th[e] 
Constitution.”115 One commentator has noted that “the most obvious 
way for a legislator to support the Constitution is to enact only 
legislation that is constitutional.”116  
                                                                                                                  
 
which upheld the right of a Pennsylvania school district to force its students to salute the flag 
against the students’ religious objections. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (overruling Gobitis). 
112 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . .”); Hodel v. 
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (“The court must 
defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is 
any rational basis for such a finding.” (citations omitted)). For a discussion of the “decline of 
deference in several doctrinal areas” see Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and 
Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 
660 (2000).  
113 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827). The Court further stated that 
“[t]his has always been the language of this Court, when that subject has called for its decision, 
and I know that it expresses the honest sentiments of each and every member of this bench.” Id.; 
see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) (noting that “the 
only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint”).  
114 See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring): 
In striking the balance the relevant considerations must be fairly, which means 
coolly, weighed with due regard to the fact that this Court is not exercising a primary 
judgment but is sitting in judgment upon those who also have taken the oath to 
observe the Constitution and who have the responsibility for carrying on 
government. 
see also Schapiro, supra note 112, at 665 (recognizing that all branches have an obligation 
to interpret the Constitution). 
115 U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 3. 
116 Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 585, 587 (1975). Similarly, “[s]tate legislatures are presumed to have acted 
within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some 
inequality.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961). Senator Orin Hatch 
professed a contrary view in a statement made to the Judges of the Third Circuit, who were 
testifying at Justice Samuel A. Alito’s confirmation hearings: “[Y]ou know, we pass 
unconstitutional legislation up here all the time and if it hadn’t been for the courts, we would 
probably not have preserved the Constitution. So I want to give you all credit for that.” 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 673 (2006) (statement of Sen. Orin Hatch). Senator Hatch’s statement, while professing 
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More important than the oath of office consideration, the Court 
should defer to legislatures because the political process, the 
foundation of democracy, is entitled to respect. The power to govern 
is and must be ultimately derived from the People. Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority117 held that it was this 
“political process” that resolves federalism questions.118 Garcia 
overruled National League of Cities v. Usery,119 which, less than a 
decade before Garcia, created a reservoir of “traditional 
governmental functions” that Congress could not regulate under the 
Commerce Clause.120 In Garcia, Justice Blackmun exhibited a 
deferential tone and held that “we have no license to employ 
freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.”121 Deference 
was due not merely because Congress takes an oath to uphold the 
Constitution, but because “the principal means chosen by the Framers 
to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the 
structure of the Federal Government itself.”122 The States are heavily 
involved in the federal political process of making law. Every 
legislator is accountable to his or her State’s electorate. Garcia 
recognized that fact and deferred to the political judgments of 
Congress, judgments the Court was not designed to make. 
3. History as History 
The most appropriate use of history is for the lessons that it 
teaches future generations. This is likely what Justice Holmes had in 
mind when he stated that “a page of history is worth a volume of 
logic.”123 In an article that catalogs the arrival of history in 
constitutional scholarship, G. Edward White concluded: “The 
significance of history for current constitutionalists can itself be seen 
                                                                                                                  
 
that he believes Congress passes unconstitutional legislations, does not necessarily imply that 
his colleagues disregarded their oath to the Constitution. Indeed, congressmen—as well as 
judges and ordinary citizens—may hold various views on the meaning of the fundamental 
document, which is not only healthy but necessary in a diverse and evolving democracy such as 
America.  
117 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
118 Id. at 556. 
119 426 U.S. 833 (1976) overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528 (1985). 
120 Id. at 852. 
121 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550.  
122 Id.  
123 N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).  
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as confirming our increased awareness that the past remains an 
inescapable dimension of our present.”124  
Other than as an instructive force, there is another role that history 
prominently plays in the Court’s decisions: as a rhetorical device. 
Every judge uses history;125 “their professional training and 
experience leads them to examine language, history, tradition, 
precedent, purpose, and consequences.”126 But the particular weight 
given to each factor, including history, is a controversial topic.127 
Even a judge who is usually ready and willing to change course will 
use history as a “useful mask for decisions reached on other 
grounds.”128 In an essay discussing the use of history in adjudication, 
Judge Posner argues that one of the three principal ways courts use 
history is rhetorically.129 Indeed, “[m]uch of what passes for 
constitutional law is a modern construct, but it is defended by 
reference to ancient . . . texts.”130  
Defending a proposition that is truly novel by reference to our 
enlightened forbearers is common in constitutional law. For example, 
in Walz, though the practice at issue had been acquiesced in since 
before the framing, Justice Douglas, the lone dissenter who would 
have held that the Constitution prohibited the pre-Revolution practice, 
relied extensively on history.131 But if history conclusively pointed to 
the other outcome, how did history help Douglas’s case? He had a 
notable, revered supporter in the cause, indeed a Founding Father: 
James Madison.132 What does the relevance of one man’s view, even 
the principal architect of the provision at issue, bear on the present 
constitutionality of a long practiced action? One answer is that “our 
ancestors had a freshness of insight or power of thought that is denied 
to us moderns[.]”133 
                                                                                                                  
124 G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 
485, 633 (2002). 
125 See supra Part I.A (discussing various ways in which judges use history).  
126 BREYER, supra note 83, at 110. 
127 Compare id. at 108 (describing the viewpoint that sees “texts as driven by purposes”), 
with SCALIA, supra note 48, at 37 (applying history to the Constitution to understand the 
original meaning of the text), and Posner, supra note 79, at 12 (arguing that a pragmatic judge is 
not deterred “when confronted with outrageous conduct that the Constitution’s framers 
neglected to foresee and make specific provision for”).  
128 Posner, supra note 18, at 593.  
129 Id.at 580.  
130 Id.at 581. 
131 See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 704–06 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(discussing Madison’s opposition to a Virginia law that levied a tax to support Christian 
Churches). 
132 See id. at 704 (“The problem takes us back where Madison was in 1784 and 1785 when 
he battled the Assessment Bill in Virginia.”). 
133 Posner, supra note 18, at 582 (arguing that this viewpoint is a mistake). 
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Given the fact that justices are not historians, expert or otherwise, 
perhaps history as a rhetorical device should be the end point. There 
is, however, a role for uncontroverted history as an instructive tool, 
most persuasively when the history bears on the direct question 
presented. Nevertheless, Justice Jackson gave a word of caution that 
the Court sometimes neglects to heed: “Some clauses could be made 
almost unworkable, as well as immutable, by refusal to indulge some 
latitude of interpretation for changing times.”134  
C. Law-Office History 
In 1965, Alfred H. Kelly charged that the Court was using the 
history books to cherry-pick facts favorable to its position, 
particularly when it broke with precedent.135 Kelly termed this 
practice “law-office” history. 136 “By invoking aboriginal meaning 
through historical inquiry, the Court managed successfully to achieve 
paradox: breaking precedence while rendering obeisance to the 
doctrine of constitutional continuity.”137 The two most controversial 
nineteenth-century cases that the Court decided—Dred Scott v. 
Sandford138 and the Income Tax Cases139—foreshadowed the current 
practice.140 Kelly described the historical essays of the Court in those 
cases: “Each of the historical essays in question was partisan; each 
used evidence wrenched from its contemporary historical context; and 
each carefully selected those materials designed to prove the thesis at 
hand, suppressing all data that might impeach the desired historical 
conclusions.”141 
In the early twentieth century, the Lochner Court resorted 
infrequently to law-office history.142 But that Court was no stranger to 
                                                                                                                  
134 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
135 See Kelly, supra note 20, at 157–58 (noting that “the present use of history by the Court 
is a Marxist-type perversion of the relation between truth and utility. It assumes that history can 
be written to serve the interests of libertarian idealism”). 
136 See id. at 122 n.13 (noting that law-office history is “the selection of data favorable to 
the position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or the proper 
evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered”).  
137 Id. at 126. 
138 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
139 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff’d on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 
(1895). 
140 See Kelly, supra note 20, at 126 (noting that “Dred Scott and the Income Tax Cases . . . 
anticipate[d] the historical technique that has taken on increasing significance in our time”). 
141 Id.  
142 See id. at 127 (“Resort to the historical essay as an activist device for breaking 
precedent was not a prominent feature of the Court’s work in the opening decades of the 
twentieth century.”).. 
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the activist establishment of partisan rights.143 The Lochner Court had 
a much more effective tool than law-office history: substantive due 
process and the infamous “freedom of contract” doctrine.144 But after 
the New Deal debacle—the Court packing plan—and Frankfurter’s 
accession from law professor to justice, the Court was for a short time 
dominated by a philosophy of restraint.145 While Frankfurter’s 
opinions often included a historical essay, not only were his essays 
accurate, but they were also used to maintain constitutional continuity 
rather than to break precedent.146 Not long after Frankfurter’s 
accession, the Court, under the lead of liberal Justices Black, 
Douglas, and Rutledge,147 reverted to law-office history to break with 
precedent and establish partisan rights.148  
A good example of the Justice Black’s use of “law-office” history 
is the reapportionment case Wesberry v. Sanders.149 Wesberry held 
that Article 1, section 2 of the Constitution required a rule of “one 
man, one vote.”150 Black began his historical discussion with the 
question presented by Wesberry; however, the question is distinct 
from the issue addressed by the framers:  
The question of how the legislature should be constituted 
precipitated the most bitter controversy of the Convention. 
One principle was uppermost in the minds of many delegates: 
that, no matter where he lived, each voter should have a voice 
equal to that of every other in electing members of 
Congress.151 
                                                                                                                  
143 The Lochner court is infamous for “attempt[ing] to engraft its own nineteenth century 
laissez-faire philosophy upon [the] Constitution . . . .” JACKSON, supra note 106, at 175.  
144 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (“The general right to make a 
contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”). 
145 Kelly, supra note 20, at 129. 
146 See id. at 129–30 n.43 (citing Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the 
Reading of Statutes, in FELIX FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE 30, 47 (Wallace Mendelson ed., 
1964)) (noting that “[o]ne particularly able commentator has remarked: ‘It would be a gross 
understatement to say that Justice Frankfurter would have been a great historian. He has been 
one.’”). 
147 Black and Douglas, however, would later disagree about how liberal the language of the 
Constitution would stretch. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Douglas 
wrote the majority opinion in Griswold, which recognized a Constitutional right to privacy. Id. 
at 481–86. Justice Black dissented in Griswold, and argued that the text of the constitution does 
not support the conclusion that the Court sought. Id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting).  
148 See Kelly, supra note 20, at 130 (noting that the “reform-minded” Justices’ searched for 
a theory of judicial review that could sustain their activism).  
149 376 U.S. 1 (1964).  
150 Id. at 7–8 (“We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, § 2, 
that Representatives be chosen ‘by the People of the several States’ means that as nearly as is 
practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”). 
151 Id. at 10. 
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Black proceeded to quote numerous members of the Constitutional 
Convention. For example, James Madison noted: “‘If the power is not 
immediately derived from the people, in proportion to their numbers, 
we may make a paper confederacy, but that will be all.’”152 That 
quote appears to contemplate a “one man, one vote rule,” as do many 
others Black selectively cites.153  
Kelly was blunt with his criticism: “Mr. Justice Black, in order to 
prove his point, mangled constitutional history.”154 And it was for 
good reason—the question Black needed answered, representation 
within the states, was not the issue in the debate. The issue was 
representation within the union.155 Black broke H. Jefferson Powell’s 
third rule for originalists: “History answers—and declines to 
answer—its own issues, rather than the concerns of the interpreter.”156  
Kelly’s “law-office” history has not disappeared.157 The more 
steam that the originalism movement gains, the more rampant “law-
office” history becomes. One issue is the divergent character and 
philosophies of the professions of law and history.158 Judges are 
trained as lawyers, a profession that prizes zealous advocacy. 
Classically trained historians, on the other hand, attempt to achieve a 
                                                                                                                  
152 Id. (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 472 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911)). 
153 See, e.g., id. at 10–11 (“[A]s James Wilson of Pennsylvania put it, equal numbers of 
people ought to have an equal no. of representatives . . . and representatives of different districts 
ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their respective constituents hold to 
each other.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
154 Kelly, supra note 20, at 135. 
155 See id. at 135 (“[T]he great debate in the Convention between the proponents of state 
equality in the legislature and the advocates of what Madison called ‘proportional 
representation’ as between the states . . . [had] nothing at all to do with the question of 
representation within the states.”).  
156 Powell, supra note 58, at 669 (emphasis removed).  
157 See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 66, at 1106 (discussing District of Columbia v. Heller, 
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), and noting that “Heller clearly demonstrates that this method [new 
originalism] rests on a perverse reading of history that is totally inconsistent with Founding-era 
practice”).  
158 Mark Tushnet, who recognized that most lawyers who do history use the “law-office” 
variety (“history-in-law” as Tushnet calls it), argued that “history-in-law” is different than 
“history” and should be evaluated by different criteria, a claim he makes about interdisciplinary 
scholarship in general. Mark Tushnet, Interdisiplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-
in-Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 934–35 (1996). “Truly effective law-office history,” said 
Tushnet, “acknowledges . . . contradictory data and explains them away.” Id. at 917–18. If 
history in law was merely used as “decoration,” see id. at 913, (in other words, rhetorically) 
perhaps Tushnet’s history in law would be harmless. Tushnet’s assessment, however, is 
oversimplified, principally where the originalist method is concerned. If an originalist applies 
history as gospel, he or she should be accurate. If, however, the originalist can easily explain 
contradictory data away—for example, Justice Scalia labeling Alexander Hamilton “the most 
expansive expositor of federal power,” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 915 n.9 (1997)—
the philosophy breaks down to the “penumbras” and “emanations” of Griswold, which 
originalism’s principal advocates of the 1980s attacked.  
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level of objectivity about the past.159 Though judges should remove 
themselves from the position of advocate when evaluating history, as 
Kelly’s observations illustrate, judges often fall far short of that 
goal.160 Federal judges are not selected solely based on their 
achievements as restrained, objective interpreters; the nominations are 
invariably politically motivated.161  
Law-office history is pertinent to this Note because a presumption 
of invalidity for novel actions requires a historical inquiry that 
consists of two questions: (1) whether the legislature or executive has 
ever undertaken the action before; and (2) whether the Constitution’s 
original meaning contemplates the action. If the Court presumes that 
novel actions are invalid, the novelty of the action should be 
uncontroverted, or at least well supported. In practice, the Court’s 
historical discussion is often of the law-office variety. When faced 
with competing versions of history the Court should, as it did most 
famously in Brown v. Board of Education,162 deem the evidence to be 
inconclusive.163  
II. THE CASE LAW: THE UNPRECEDENTED ARGUMENT 
This Part considers the use of history in three divisive areas of 
constitutional law: (1) separation of powers, specifically the 
President’s removal power; (2) the Court’s anti-commandeering 
principle; and (3) state sovereign immunity. The last two topics are 
merged into the broader heading of federalism. There are two main 
themes that bind the three areas of constitutional law. There is no text 
directly related to the Court’s holdings, and the unprecedented 
                                                                                                                  
159 See NOVICK, supra note 72, at 2 (“The objective historian’s role is that of a neutral, or 
disinterested, judge; it must never degenerate into that of advocate or, even worse, 
propagandist.”). Though the “founding fathers of the historical profession” valued objectivity, 
Novick describes the polarized period of the 1960s through the present as a crisis in objectivity. 
Id. at 573. That the history profession itself questions objectivity strengthens the objections to 
the elevation of “history”—whether the founders’ intentions, historical meaning, or past 
congressional practice—to trump judicial precedent and reason, or worse, a decision of the 
people’s representatives.  
160 Novick actually compares the historian’s goal of objectivity to the “judicial qualities of 
balance and evenhandedness.” Id. at 2. But, in practice, when history and the judiciary mix 
those qualities seem to be abandoned and the opinions read like that of an advocate, not of an 
objective historian.  
161 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 143 (2005) (“Since the earliest days of the Republic, the vast majority 
of federal jurists have been affiliated with a partisan group and, in fact, have shared the party 
affiliation of the president who nominated them.”).  
162 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
163 Id. at 489 (“This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these 
sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At 
best, they are inconclusive.”). 
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argument is rampant in the Court’s decisions. How rampant, or more 
precisely, whether the absence of historical precedent generates a 
presumption of invalidity is the question with which this Part 
grapples. This Part concludes that the Court’s language indeed 
supports a presumption of invalidity. The following Part, Part III, 
argues that, despite Part II’s conclusion, such a presumption is 
unjustified and should be avoided.164  
A. The Decision of 1789: Binding in 2010 
Justice Robert H. Jackson, concurring in the Steel Seizure Case, 
stated that “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or 
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum 
. . . .”165 Justice Jackson’s discussion of implied authorization 
presupposes the use of historical practice to construe the scope of 
presidential power.166 How history should be used, and, at least 
regarding the President’s power to remove non-judicial executive 
officers, what the history books actually tell us is subject to much 
debate.167  
The landmark case, Myers v. United States,168 was authored by 
William Howard Taft, the only Chief Justice who was also 
President.169 The question required the Court to interpret Article II’s 
                                                                                                                  
164 Whether the Court merely invokes the unprecedented argument as “empty rhetoric” or a 
mask for a decision reached on other grounds is another question. The inherent flaws of 
affording such great weight to historical silence and the stark ideological divide in these cases 
suggest that the Court’s invocations are mere rhetoric to disguise a larger theory or plan. The 
language nonetheless becomes enshrined in the holdings for lower courts to erroneously subject 
novel actions to an insurmountable hurdle in the form of a presumption of invalidity. See supra 
notes 12–13 and accompanying text (citing and discussing the lower court rulings on the 
individual mandate’s constitutionality, some of which base the conclusion on the unprecedented 
argument).  
165 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
166 See Brown, supra note 55, at 195 (discussing the consent theory of tradition and noting 
that the “Court allocates governmental rights to the branches based on the same type of claim 
and acquiescence” as adverse possession).  
167 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3166 
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, in dissent, disagrees with the majority about the 
meaning of the lack of a historical record: “Scholars, like Members of this Court, have 
continued to disagree, not only about the inferences that should be drawn from the inconclusive 
historical record, but also about the nature of the original disagreement.” Id. 
168 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
169 Whether Chief Justice Taft was at all swayed by his former position is unclear. See 
Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, Substance, and 
Administrative Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 735 (1987): 
Most commentators explain the broad sweep of the opinion by Taft’s unique status 
as the only member of the Supreme Court ever to have occupied the White House. 
Yet this fact raises one last ironic question about the opinion: if the requirement of 
senatorial consent for the removal of postmasters truly were an intolerable 
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grant of power to the President. There is no express provision 
regarding the removal of officers appointed by the President.170 The 
majority and dissenting opinions in Myers extensively reviewed the 
history surrounding the question of whether the President has the sole 
power to remove all executive, non-judicial officers, or whether 
Congress may condition removal on the advice and consent of the 
Senate.171  
The Chief Justice recognized that the Court has repeatedly laid 
down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of 
the Constitution . . . acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the 
construction to be given its provisions.”172 By using this as its 
standard to analyze the issue before it, the Court made a historical 
inquiry necessary and, similar to today’s originalists, binding.173 The 
inquiry, as with all “absence-of-precedent-equals-absence-of-power” 
cases, involves two questions: the Constitution’s original meaning or 
the framers’ intent and the historical practices of constitutional actors 
ever since.  
In 1789, the First Congress deliberated and debated about the new 
government’s structure; it had to fashion a body around the skeleton. 
One piece was the establishment of “three executive departments—
one of Foreign Affairs, another of the Treasury, and a third of 
War.”174 On May 19, 1789, Representative James Madison moved to 
                                                                                                                  
 
infringement upon executive power, how did Taft himself manage to ignore it during 
his four years in the presidency? 
170 See Myers, 272 U.S. at 109 (noting that Article II, section 4 deals only with 
impeachments). Representative William Loughton Smith’s view, in 1789, was to the contrary. 
See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 372 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (noting Mr. Smith’s position that 
the officer was to remain in office until impeached by the Senate). In the Federalist 77, 
Alexander Hamilton was of the view that “[t]he consent of that body [the Senate] would be 
necessary to displace as well as to appoint.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 101, at 387 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, 
The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 n.114 (1994) (discussing 
Hamilton’s view and the controversy surrounding it in later publications of the Federalist 
Papers, some of which included a statement that qualified the position as rejected). Hamilton’s 
view was not to the extreme of Smith’s, but it illustrates that by no means was there a consensus 
in 1789 that the President had the sole power to remove non-judicial officers.  
171 Myers, 272 U.S. at 106.  
172 Id. at 175 (citing cases). 
173 The history used by Taft is indeed “law-office” history of the highest order. Kelly, 
however, did not see an issue with it because “the essay [was not] heavily activist or 
interventionist in its political overtones.” Kelly, supra note 20, at 127. But see Edward S. 
Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the Constitution, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 
353, 399 (1927) (“In the form in which it today stands, Myers v. United States is not only a 
menacing challenge to an administrative organization which represents years of planning and 
experimentation in meeting modern conditions—it is a positive instigation to strife between the 
President and Congress.”). 
174 Myers, 272 U.S. at 111. 
 4/10/2012 1:40:11 PM 
2011] CLIO ON STEROIDS 551 
create a “Department of Foreign Affairs, at the head of which there 
shall be an officer . . . to be removable by the President.”175 Mr. 
Smith (of South Carolina) objected and moved to strike “to be 
removed by the President” because “it declared the President alone to 
have the power of removal.”176 Madison disagreed with Smith’s 
construction that impeachment was necessary for the palpable reason 
that “[i]t would in effect establish every officer of the Government on 
the firm tenure of good behavior[.]”177 That, Madison stated, would 
be “a fatal error interwoven in the system . . . .”178 Dispute ensued and 
four different views emerged.179 Commenting shortly after Myers, 
Edward S. Corwin noted that three separate factions—those, 
including Madison, who believed, that the removal power was vested 
solely in the President by the Constitution, those who believed that 
removal required the advice and consent of the Senate, and those who 
thought that Congress should decide under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause—were fairly equal in membership.180 Smith, who thought 
removal required an impeachment, was in the minority.181  
Myers discussed the dispute and the arguments surrounding it in 
depth.182 In Chief Justice Taft’s view, the dispute was resolved 
decisively in favor of Madison.183 That was what the Chief Justice 
characterized as the “decision of 1789,”184 a decision that, according 
to the Court, was binding more than one hundred years later.185  
Despite Taft’s confidence, commentators have been exceptionally 
skeptical about his view of the events that took place in May of 
                                                                                                                  
175 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 370–71 (1789) (Joseph Gales, ed., 1834) (emphasis added).  
176 Id. at 371. 
177 Id. at 372. 
178 Id. 
179 See Corwin, supra note 173, at 361 (presenting those four views).  
180 Id.  
181 Id. at 361–62 n.22. 
182 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 114–15 (1926) (noting “[t]he discussion was a 
very full one” and “[i]t is convenient in the course of our discussion of this case to review the 
reasons advanced by Mr. Madison and his associates for their conclusion”). 
183 Id.at 115 (“James Madison was then a leader in the House, as he had been in the 
Convention. His arguments in support of the President's constitutional power of removal 
independently of Congressional provision, and without the consent of the Senate, were masterly, 
and he carried the House.”). 
184 Id. at 145.  
185 See id. at 174–75: 
It was the Congress that launched the Government. . . . It was the Congress in which 
Mr. Madison, one of the first in the framing of the Constitution, led also in the 
organization of the Government under it. It was a Congress whose constitutional 
decisions have always been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of the greatest 
weight in the interpretation of that fundamental instrument. 
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1789.186 Corwin, commenting in 1927, noted that “a mere fraction of 
a fraction, a minority of a minority, of the House, can be shown to 
have attributed the removal power to the President on the grounds of 
executive prerogative.”187 Further, “no reliable record of the Senate 
deliberations exists,”188 and the Senate’s vote was equal, with Vice 
President John Adams casting the deciding vote.189  
Furthermore, the First Congress did not create all executive offices 
equally. The Department of the Treasury, unlike the Departments of 
Foreign Affairs and War, was not denominated as an executive 
department.190 And the Secretary of the Treasury was to report to 
either branch of the legislature “all matters referred to him by the 
Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall appertain to his 
office.”191 The duties of the Treasury officials were specified at great 
length, which limited presidential discretion.192 The Comptroller, an 
office within the Department of Treasury, was shielded from 
presidential direction.193 At bottom, “the Myers Court[] fail[ed] to 
present the complete story of the Decision of 1789.”194  
The second component of Taft’s decision was Congress’s apparent 
acquiescence in the unitary executive construction. The Chief Justice 
declared, “This construction was followed by the legislative 
department and the executive department continuously for 73 years 
. . . .”195 But Myers was decided in 1927, not 1863, when the statute 
that broke the trend, the Currency Act, was passed by Congress and 
                                                                                                                  
186 See Entin, supra note 169, at 716 (“Others who have reviewed the debates find the 
evidence of congressional intent ambiguous indeed.”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra, note 170, at 4 
(“Any faithful reader of history must conclude that the unitary executive, conceived in the 
foregoing way, is just myth.”); see also Myers, 272 U.S. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The 
arguments drawn from the executive power of the President . . . seem to me spider’s webs 
inadequate to control the dominant facts.”). 
187 Corwin, supra note 173, at 362. 
188 Entin, supra note 169, at 716. 
189 Myers, 272 U.S. at 115 (noting that the final Senate vote was tied at ten votes in favor 
and ten votes against, and that the Vice President’s vote was necessary to reach the decision). 
190 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 170, at 27. 
191 Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12 § 2, 1 Stat. 66 (1789).  
192 See id. at §§ 1–8 (establishing the duties of Treasury Department officials). 
193 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 170, at 18 n.71 (quoting Act to Establish the Treasury 
Department, ch. 12, §§ 7–8, 1 Stat. 67): 
The Act contained a general removal clause that stated: ‘if any person shall offend 
against any of the prohibitions of this act, he shall be deemed guilty of a high 
misdemeanor, . . . and shall upon conviction be removed from office.’ . . . Compare 
this with the removal provision for the Secretary, which stated simply ‘[t]hat 
whenever the Secretary shall be removed from office by the President,’ without 
providing any limitations on the President’s removal power. 
194 Id. at 24.  
195 Myers, 272 U.S. at 175. 
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signed by President Lincoln.196 The Tenure of Office Act,197 which 
the postmaster statute198 at issue in Myers was modeled after, was the 
true deviation. That statute barred Vice President Johnson from 
dismissing members of President Lincoln’s cabinet without the advice 
and consent of the Senate.199 Chief Justice Taft dismissed the Tenure 
of Office Act because it was passed “during a heated political 
difference of opinion between the then President and the majority 
leaders of Congress.”200 These heated differences involved the 
Reconstruction that followed the Civil War. President Johnson, a 
Democrat from Tennessee, was seen by the Radical Republicans as a 
southern supporter. Taft referred to the legislation as “an attempt to 
re-distribute the powers and minimize those of the President.”201 The 
Tenure of Office Act was repealed in 1887, but the postmaster 
statute—a statute with which Taft the President fully complied—
lasted until Myers struck it down.202 The President acquiesced in 
conditioned removals almost as long as Congress acquiesced in the 
spoils system.  
Nevertheless, the Myers Court held that by Congress’s early 
acquiescence and a selective—to put it politely—reading of a 
decision made by its first members, Congress lost the power to 
control presidential removals by conditioning them on the advice and 
consent of the Senate.203 The dissenters, Justices Holmes, Brandeis, 
                                                                                                                  
196 Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863). The act was an attack on the spoils 
system that was rampant in the national government. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 282–83 (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the spoils system was the reason Congress did not condition removal 
on the Senates advice and consent).  
197 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430, amended by Act of Apr. 5, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 6 
(1869), repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500 (1887). 
198 Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, 19 Stat. 78. The Act provided that postmasters of the 
first, second, and third classes could only be removed, prior to their four year term, with the 
advice and consent of the senate. Id. at § 6. 
199 See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867): 
Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of 
the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the Attorney-General, shall hold their 
offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have 
been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.  
Johnson vetoed the bill, but it nonetheless was passed. Johnson’s defiance—firing the 
Secretary of War—was the subject of his impeachment trial, at which he narrowly escaped 
conviction.  
200 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926).  
201 Id. at 167. 
202 See Entin, supra note 169, at 735–36 (footnote omitted) (“As President, Taft dismissed 
scores of postmasters. In each instance he scrupulously complied with the law that he found so 
obnoxious in Myers.”). 
203 Myers, 272 U.S. at 165. The broad sweeps of Taft’s opinion, however, may seem 
broader than they actually are. Lessig and Sunstein note three concessions made by Taft in 
Myers: 
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and McReynolds, thoroughly disagreed.204 Both the inferences drawn 
from and usage of (or the absence of) history were thought to be 
extremely problematic by the dissenting opinions.205 Justice Brandeis, 
providing an alternative, more probable explanation noted: “The long 
delay in adopting legislation to curb removals was not because 
Congress accepted the doctrine that the Constitution had vested in the 
President uncontrollable power over removal. It was because the 
spoils system held sway.”206  
Soon after Myers, the dissenters prevailed, at least in part. In 
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,207 the broad sweep of Chief 
Justice Taft’s majority opinion was confined to “the narrow point 
actually decided,” which was “only that the President had [the] power 
to remove a postmaster of the first class.”208The Humphrey Court held 
that the agency at issue, the Federal Trade Commission, could not be 
properly “characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive.”209 
Thus, the requirement that the President must show cause for removal 
of one of its members did not violate the “decision of 1789.”210 But 
the Court, somewhat ominously, stated that for cases that fall between 
Myers and Humphrey “there shall remain a field of doubt.”211  
June 28, 2010, more than 200 years after Madison marshaled his 
arguments in the First Congress, the “decision of 1789” still 
                                                                                                                  
 
First, it said that the Civil Service Act, immunizing inferior officers from plenary 
presidential control, did not offend Article II and the unitariness of the executive 
branch. Second, the Court agreed that officers with adjudicative duties could be 
immunized from presidential influence, even if those officers operated within the 
executive branch . . . . Third, it said that Congress might be able to prevent the 
President from “overruling” administrators in certain instances, even if he disagrees 
with them . . . . 
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 170, at 23–24. Even Solicitor General James M. Beck, 
arguing for the executive, suggested that “for-cause” removals would be constitutional, what 
Beck called a “middle ground.” Myers, 272 U.S. at 96 (oral argument). 
204 For example, Justice McReynolds, perplexed as to the origin of this Presidential power, 
noted: “I think there is no such power. Certainly it is not given by any plain words of the 
Constitution; and the argument advanced to establish it seems to me forced and unsubstantial.” 
Myers, 272 U.S. at 179 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).  
205 The dissenting opinions noted that the “decision of 1789” was not even before the 
Court. See id. at 187 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (noting the issue up for debate is “inferior 
officer[s]” whereas the “long-continued practice and supposed early legislative construction” 
dealt with “superior officer[s]”); id. at 242 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting “the question 
involved in the action taken by Congress after the great debate of 1789 is not before us”). 
206 Id. at 282–83 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
207 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
208 Id. at 626. 
209 Id. at 628.  
210 Id. at 631.  
211 Id. at 632.  
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controlled. In 2002, “[a]fter a series of celebrated accounting 
debacles,”212 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,213 
which “established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”) to oversee the audit of public companies that are subject 
to the securities laws, and related matters.”214 The members of the 
board were appointed for defined terms by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and were removable, for cause, by the 
same.215 After the PCAOB began investigation into an accounting 
firm’s procedures, the firm brought suit for a declaratory judgment, 
arguing that the way PCAOB members were removed violated 
separation of powers principles and was unconstitutional.216  
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board,217 the Court agreed.218 The question was one of first 
impression, as the Court had never “considered a situation where a 
restriction on removal passes through two levels of control.”219 The 
Supreme Court took this opportunity to revitalize Myers’s erroneous 
interpretation of the “decision of 1789”: “This Decision of 1789 
provides contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the 
Constitution’s meaning since many of the Members of the First 
Congress had taken part in framing that instrument. . . . And it soon 
became the settled and well understood construction of the 
Constitution.”220  
Undertones and express invocations of the unprecedented (or 
fixed-construction) argument pervade the majority opinion.221 The 
                                                                                                                  
212 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010). 
213 Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).  
214 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006). 
215 Id. at (e)(4)–(6) (providing the procedures for appointing and removing board 
members).  
216 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3149.  
217 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
218 Id. at 3147 (holding that “such multilevel protection from removal is contrary to Article 
II’s vesting of the executive power in the President”). 
219 Id. at 3149 (quotation omitted). The idea is that the SEC Commissioners are only 
removable “for cause” (first level) and the Board members are also only removable “for cause.” 
Thus, the President conceptually cannot remove the Board members because he lacks control of 
the SEC Commissioners. That logic, however, is inherently flawed. There is no statute that says 
the SEC commissioners are removable for cause. See id. at 3182–83 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
Justice Breyer noted that the majority “reads into the statute books a ‘for cause removal’ phrase 
that does not appear in the relevant statute and which Congress probably did not intend to 
write.” Id. at 3184. That is the Avoidance Doctrine in reverse. See id. (“This is not a statutory 
construction that seeks to avoid a constitutional question, but its opposite.”). But this criticism 
of the majority may be out of place. Most agree that the SEC is an independent agency, the 
essential characteristic of which is limited removal power of the President.  
220 Id. at 1352 (majority opinion) (quotation omitted). 
221 For example, “[t]his novel structure does not merely add to the Board's independence, 
but transforms it.” Id. at 3154.; “[t]hat is why the Framers sought to ensure that ‘those who are 
employed in the execution of the law will be in their proper situation, and the chain of 
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Court was clear that the novelty of the act was practically fatal: 
“Perhaps the most telling indication of the severe constitutional 
problem with the PCAOB is the lack of historical precedent for this 
entity.”222  
Such reliance on history would seem valid only if there was 
general agreement that in 1789 the First Congress’s opinion was 
clearly that the Constitution afforded the President unilateral power to 
remove all non-judicial appointees, a power that could not be 
qualified by later Congresses. Since the Myers decision was issued, 
the “decision of 1789” and the inferences drawn from it are, at the 
very least, highly controversial.223 Myers is law-office history of the 
highest order, 224 and Free Enterprise Fund reinvigorated it.225 But, as 
Corwin noted, “what a judge cannot prove he can still decide.”226 The 
numerous logical flaws in the Free Enterprise Fund majority’s 
analysis seem to suggest its reverence for a divisive, narrow decision 
made by Congress in 1789 was merely a “useful mask for [a] 
                                                                                                                  
 
dependence be preserved; the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest, will depend, as 
they ought, on the President, and the President on the community.’” Id. at 3155 (quoting 1 
ANNALS OF CONG. 499 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James Madison)); “The 
Framers did not rest our liberties on such bureaucratic minutiae.” Id. at 3156; “The Framers 
created a structure . . . .” Id. at 3157. See also id. at 3156–57 n.6 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 
612 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834): 
Madison’s actual proposal, consistent with his view of the Constitution, was that the 
Comptroller hold office for a term of ‘years, unless sooner removed by the 
President’; he would thus be ‘dependent upon the President, because he can be 
removed by him,’ and also ‘dependent upon the Senate, because they must consent to 
his [reappointment] for every term of years. 
The list goes on.  
222 Id. at 3159 (quotation and citation omitted). It is noteworthy that, in support of the 
proposition, the dissenting Judge below cited Justice Holmes: “‘[A] page of history is worth a 
volume of logic.’” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 
349 (1921) (Holmes, J.)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). But 
given Justice Holmes’ dissent in Myers it is unlikely that he meant for his statement to transform 
into a presumption of invalidity for novel actions, especially in the area of presidential power.  
223 See supra notes 167–212 and accompanying text.  
224 See Corwin, supra note 173, at 369 (“Viewed purely as history, the Chief Justice’s 
interpretation of the decision of 1789 is without validity.”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 170, 
at 32 (“The early Congresses' practice undermines the claim that the founding vision was 
motivated by a single organizational ideal.”).  
225 The Court did so, however, with little actual consequence to Congress’s scheme. The 
strong language and revitalization of Myers, and its view of presidential power, may be a sign of 
what the Court—or some of its members—truly has in store for independent agencies such as 
the PCAOB.  
226 Corwin, supra note 173, at 369.  
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decision[] reached on other grounds,”227 namely the unitary executive 
philosophy.228  
Free Enterprise Fund may state a broader principle. That 
principle, though misguided, is that of a presumption of 
unconstitutionality for novel congressional actions. Chief Justice 
Roberts does not announce that principle. The Chief Justice, however, 
implicitly acknowledges that the absence of history limits Congress’s 
powers by preaching the novelty of the statute in question. That 
argument is expressly invoked in the Court’s federalism decisions, 
which are considered next.229  
B. Federalism and the Framers 
The starkest evidence of a presumption of invalidity lies in the 
Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence. This Section discusses the 
Court’s use of history in these cases.  
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida230 dealt with the centuries-old 
doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Florida refused to consent to be 
sued under the Indian Gaming Regulation Act, which abrogated 
sovereign immunity pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.231 The 
issue was whether Congress could constitutionally abrogate Florida’s 
sovereign immunity using its commerce power.232  
The only text related to sovereign immunity in the Constitution is 
the Eleventh Amendment, which states: “The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
                                                                                                                  
227 Posner, supra note 18, at 593. 
228 Aside from the Court’s questionable interpretation of both history and federal law, the 
logic that one for-cause level is permissible but two is not is lacking. Put best by Justice Breyer 
in dissent, the Court’s logic is “elementary arithmetical logic (i.e., ‘one plus one is greater than 
one’) . . . .” Free Enter. Fund, v. Pub. Co. Accounting & Oversight Bd. 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3176 
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
229 Here, it is important to note that Myers and Free Enterprise Fund (and Frankfurter’s 
concurrence in the Steel Seizure case) can be distinguished from the federalism decisions 
discussed next (e.g., Printz). In certain cases, “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long 
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned” may justify reliance on 
the absence of congressional action to infer presidential power. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In such a case, 
Congress, with notice of the action, could be deemed to assent to it. See Holmes, supra note 1, 
at 476 (“Sometimes it is said that, if a man neglects to enforce his rights, he cannot complain if, 
after a while, the law follows his example.”). Where the history is clear to the point that the 
President’s power is and has been effectively assumed for a long term of years, a “gloss” on 
presidential power could be appropriate. The “decision of 1789” and the inferences that should 
be drawn from it are, however, far from clear. Frankfurter’s “claim and acquiescence” theory is 
considered more fully in Part IV.A infra.  
230 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
231 Id. at 53–55. 
232 Id. at 58. 
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Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”233 Though that amendment appears to prohibit only cases 
involving diversity jurisdiction against a state, the Court has found 
that it stands for the “presupposition . . . that each State is a sovereign 
entity in our federal system . . . .”234 Thus, for a state to be a 
defendant in federal court it must either consent or answer to a valid 
exercise of Congress’s power to abrogate sovereign immunity. In 
1989, the Court held that Congress could abrogate sovereign 
immunity pursuant to the Commerce Clause, but without a majority 
opinion.235 Seminole Tribe overruled that case, deeming it a departure 
from established law.236 The conclusion followed that Congress had 
overstepped its bounds, and the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the 
claim.  
Four Justices disagreed. The dissent argued that state sovereign 
immunity is a common law doctrine that is appropriately abrogated 
by a legislature.237 The majority responded by referring to the 
dissent’s argument as a “new theory of state sovereign immunity.”238 
For example, the majority remarked that “[t]his sweeping statement 
ignores the fact that the Nation survived for nearly two centuries 
without the question of the existence of such power ever being 
presented to this Court.”239  
The next case considered, Printz v. United States,240 involved the 
1993 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.241 The act required 
local chief law enforcement officers (“CLEO”) to perform 
background checks on potential hand-gun purchasers for a period of 
sixty months until a federal regulatory system was operational.242 
Sheriff Jay Printz of Ravelli County, Montana, and Sheriff Richard 
Mack of Graham County, Arizona, brought suit claiming that the 
                                                                                                                  
233 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The amendment was passed after the Court’s decision in 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XI, which held that a state could be sued in federal court by a private citizen of 
another state. Id. at 479. 
234 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1890)); 
see also id. at 54–55 n.7 (citing numerous cases).  
235 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
236 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.  
237 See id. at 102 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion was “at odds with 
the Founders’ view that common law, when it was received into the new American legal system, 
was always subject to legislative amendment”). In an expansive dissent, Justice Souter stakes 
out this claim in detail and also casts doubt on Hans, on which the majority extensively relied. 
Id. 
238 Id. at 71 (majority opinion) (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 157 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
239 Id. 
240 521 U.S. 898, 903 (1997). 
241 Pub. L. No. 103–159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993). 
242 Id. at 903.  
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Brady Act impermissibly commandeered their state offices and 
violated the Constitution’s federalism principles.243  
The question before the Court implicated far-reaching, complex 
concerns about the federal structure of our government similar to 
those in New York v. United States.244 In Printz, “Because there [was] 
no constitutional text speaking to this precise question,” the Court 
looked to history, structure, and precedent for the answer.245 To begin 
the historical analysis, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, noted:  
[C]ontemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution 
. . . , acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the 
construction to be given its provisions. Conversely if, . . . 
earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive 
power, we would have reason to believe that the power was 
thought not to exist.246 
That standard explicitly stated what Seminole Tribe and Myers 
implied: novel government actions are presumed invalid.  
The federal government and Printz both contended that the history 
books supported their side.247 The Court, after distinguishing 
                                                                                                                  
243 Id. at 904–05.  
244 505 U.S. 144 (1992). New York invalidated a federal law that required the New York 
legislature to comply with the Congress’s low-level radioactive waste laws or take title to it 
because the law was so coercive it impermissibly commandeered the New York legislature. Id. 
at 149, 153–54. The case before the Court in New York was arguably different because the 
CLEO’s would not be mandating the check but simply performing it. Thus, the accountability 
concerns of New York are mitigated. That, however, is the topic for another discussion.  
245 Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (emphasis added). The four dissenting Justices, led by Justice 
Stevens, directly opposed that view. Id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he text of 
the Constitution provides a sufficient basis for a correct disposition of th[is] case[].”). The 
dissenting Justices argued that the Brady Act was constitutional under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause since it is uncontested, aside from “the revisionist views expressed by Justice Thomas,” 
that the provision is otherwise constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Id. Justice Scalia 
castigated the dissent for resorting to the “last, best hope to those who defend ultra vires 
congressional action[s].” Id. at 923. But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (noting “the nature of the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . 
empowers Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its 
authority to enact in isolation”). In Raich, Justice Scalia argued that Printz is distinguishable 
because the issue in Raich raised no state sovereignty concerns. Id.; but see id. at 57 (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (noting that “whatever the wisdom of California’s experiment with medical 
marijuana, the federalism principles that have driven our Commerce Clause cases require that 
room for experiment be protected in this case.”). 
246 Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
247 See id. (quotation and citation omitted): 
Petitioners contend that compelled enlistment of state executive officers for the 
administration of federal programs is, until very recent years at least, unprecedented. 
The Government contends, to the contrary, that “the earliest Congresses enacted 
statutes that required the participation of state officials in the implementation of 
federal laws.” 
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numerous historical incidents similar to the power asserted by the 
Brady Act, agreed with Printz.248 The Court held that the “utter lack” 
of affirmative historical precedent “suggests an assumed absence of 
such power.”249 “[T]wo centuries of apparent congressional 
avoidance of the practice,” said Justice Scalia, “tends to negate the 
existence” of the power.250  
Printz’s historical analysis displayed many of the same flaws for 
which Alfred H. Kelly criticized the Court in 1965. In fact, there was 
arguably a fair amount of historical precedent for the government’s 
action.251 If there was so much contradictory data—indeed Justice 
Scalia attempted to explain much of it away in footnotes—why was it 
necessary to muddle through the history to decisively conclude 
novelty? The Court could have simply extended New York, which 
prohibited Congress from commandeering state legislatures, to 
include the executive branch of state governments. There were strong 
arguments, though not as strong as those in New York, that the Brady 
Act provisions violated the Tenth Amendment and “fail[ed] to adhere 
to the design and structure of our constitutional scheme.”252 The 
argument was weaker, given that the requirement’s temporariness and 
reduction of the accountability concern, which was reduced because 
the state officers would only be performing the federal mandate rather 
than mandating a concealed federal mandate.253 On the other hand, if 
novel actions are presumed invalid, the weaker arguments easily 
prevail.  
A few years later, in Alden v. Maine,254 the Court extended 
Seminole Tribe to prohibit Congress from relying on the commerce 
power to subject states to suits in their own courts for damages. 
Alden, though analytically consistent with Seminole Tribe, indeed 
almost more appropriate under the common law reasoning,255 is 
nonetheless far more troubling—in terms of historical analysis—than 
Seminole Tribe. A group of probation officers sued Maine for 
                                                                                                                  
248 See, e.g., id. at 915 (“If it was indeed Hamilton's view that the Federal Government 
could direct the officers of the States, that view has no clear support in Madison's writings, or as 
far as we are aware, in text, history, or early commentary elsewhere.”); id. at 910 (noting that 
“none of these statements necessarily implies” the power asserted here).  
249 Id. at 907–08.  
250 Id. at 918. 
251 See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the contradictory evidence. 
252 Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
253 See supra note 245 (discussing the mitigation of the accountability concern). 
254 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
255 The King cannot be brought to his own courts without consent. See id. at 741 (“In 
England, the rule was well established that no lord could be sued by a vassal in his own court, 
but each petty lord was subject to suit in the courts of a higher lord.” (quotation and citation 
omitted)). But, Alden is a bit different because the law is federal, not state. The “King” did not 
make the law.  
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violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act in federal court.256 When 
Seminole Tribe was decided, the federal district court dismissed the 
action on state sovereignty grounds.257 The group of probation 
officers attempted to pursue their claims in state court, but each court 
up through the Maine Supreme Court dismissed on the basis of 
sovereign immunity.258  
After determining that the question was one of first impression, the 
Court, similar to Printz, determined that “history, practice, precedent, 
and the structure of the Constitution” would be the guide.259 That 
inquiry was necessary because the only textual source of sovereign 
immunity in the Constitution is ambiguous.260 The first two prongs of 
the analysis can be distilled to two related questions: (1) was it the 
intent or understanding at the time of the framing to allow such suits 
in state court; and (2) until now, has Congress acted as if it had the 
power? Under the reasoning of Printz—which the Court explicitly 
cites—if both questions are answered in the negative (i.e., historical 
silence), then a presumption of invalidity follows.  
Justice Kennedy first noted that “the historical record gives no 
instruction as to the founding generation’s intent to preserve the 
States’ immunity from suit in their own courts.”261 The inference 
drawn from that statement is “that the Founders’ silence is best 
explained by the simple fact that no one, not even the Constitution’s 
most ardent opponents, suggested the document might strip the States 
of the immunity.”262 Alden, contrasted with Printz, provided more 
analysis as to why such a sweeping inference was drawn from a blank 
page. The wartime debts of the states were large.263 Opponents 
                                                                                                                  
256 Alden, 527 U.S. at 711. 
257 Id. at 712. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 741. 
260 See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (Scalia, J.) 
(“Despite the narrowness of its terms, . . . we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to 
stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure 
which it confirms . . . .”). 
261 Alden, 527 U.S. at 741.  
262 Id. Justice Kennedy, the author of Alden, took the same view in oral argument: 
Mr. Waxman: . . . I don’t think that there is anything in the Constitutional 
Convention debates that goes to the question of suits against States in their own 
courts at all, let alone under Federal law. . . . 
[Justice Kennedy]: But—but that’s the point. It’s the dog that doesn’t bark argument. 
And the anti-federalists didn’t bring this up either. If the Constitution had 
contemplated it, certainly the anti-federalists would have made the statement. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (No. 98–346).  
263 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 741 (noting “the overriding concern regarding the States’ war-
time debts”).  
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attacked the Constitution with great “creativity, foresight, and vivid 
imagination.”264 Some framers “contended that no individual could 
sue a sovereign without its consent.”265 And, finally, “the furor raised 
by Chisholm, and the speed and unanimity with which the [Eleventh] 
Amendment was adopted . . . underscore the jealous care with which 
the founding generation sought to preserve the sovereign immunity of 
the States.”266 Those points, according to the Court, made it “difficult 
to conceive that the Constitution would have been adopted if it had 
been understood to strip the States of immunity from suit in their own 
courts and cede to the Federal Government a power to subject 
nonconsenting States to private suits in these fora.”267  
The argument, which Kennedy made explicitly in oral 
argument,268 is that the dog did not bark at a possible intrusion of 
state sovereign immunity during the founding; therefore, it must have 
survived. That allusion, stated explicitly, although controversially, in 
other cases,269 is to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s short story Silver Blaze, 
which featured Sherlock Holmes on the trail of a stolen race horse.270 
The problems with the “dog that didn’t bark” argument are discussed 
in Part III.C.2 infra.  
                                                                                                                  
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 742. Justice Kennedy cites 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 555 (Jonathan Elliot, ed., 2d ed. 1901) (remarks 
of J. Marshall) in support of that proposition. Id. That debate, which occurred during the 
Virginia ratification debates, was discussed in depth by Justice Brennan, dissenting in 
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 264–65 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Similar to the infamous “decision of 1789,” the intent that a faithful reader of the debates would 
glean is less clear. See id. at 269–70 (“Even if this adequately characterized the substance of 
their views, they were a minority of those given at the Convention. Mason, Henry, Pendleton, 
and Randolph all took an opposing position.”). Another reason to doubt statement’s 
applicability is that the question that was being debated, suits under state law for debts owed, 
was grounded in contract law, seemingly a very different question than Congress’s abrogation 
of state sovereign immunity under its Article I, section 8 powers. Id.  
266 Alden, 527 U.S. at 743.  
267 Id. 
268 See supra note 262 for the exchange in Alden’s oral argument.  
269 See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 132 (2005) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396, n.23 (1991) 
(“The Court has endorsed the view that Congress’ silence on questions such as this one ‘can be 
likened to the dog that did not bark.’”). The efficacy of this argument—at least as applied to 
legislative history—was doubted by the dissenting justices in Chisom, including Kennedy, who 
composed part of the majority in Alden. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 406 (Scalia, J., dissenting, 
joined by Kennedy, J., & Rehnquist, C.J.) (internal citations omitted): 
Apart from the questionable wisdom of assuming that dogs will bark when 
something important is happening, . . . we have forcefully and explicitly rejected the 
Conan Doyle approach to statutory construction in the past. . . . We are here to apply 
the statute, not legislative history, and certainly not the absence of legislative history. 
Statutes are the law though sleeping dogs lie.  
270 See ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 1–
29 (Christopher Roden ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993).  
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The second question (congressional practice) was similarly 
answered in the negative. The Court, reiterating Printz, held that “‘the 
utter lack of statutes’ subjecting States to suit, ‘suggests an assumed 
absence of such power.’”271 And the congressional practice of the 
“last generation” is of “‘such recent vintage that they are no more 
probative than the [FLSA] of a constitutional tradition that lends 
meaning to the text. Their persuasive force is far outweighed by 
almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the 
practice.’”272 The departure, Justice Kennedy held, reflects an 
“erroneous view.”273  
The remaining two considerations, precedent and constitutional 
structure, were similarly found—though not uncontested by the 
dissent—to support Maine’s claim to sovereign immunity.274 Alden 
strongly implied, if not expressly stated, that there is a presumption of 
invalidity for novel actions:  
That we have, during the first 210 years of our constitutional 
history, found it unnecessary to decide the question presented 
here suggests a federal power to subject nonconsenting States 
to private suits in their own courts is unnecessary to uphold 
the Constitution and valid federal statutes as the supreme 
law.275  
Seminole Tribe, Printz, Alden, and Free Enterprise Fund provide 
lower courts with plenty of language to assert a presumption of 
invalidity for novel actions. The judge presiding over the challenge to 
the individual mandate in Florida did just that in ruling on the 
government’s motion to dismiss.276 The next Part discusses the 
analytical flaws of the presumption of invalidity and argues that it 
should be avoided.  
III. THE PRESUMPTION OF INVALIDITY IS UNSOUND 
“[W]hat history teaches are the traditions from which it developed 
as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living 
thing. . . . No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for 
judgment and restraint.”277 
                                                                                                                  
271 Alden, 527 U.S. at 744 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907–908 (1997)). 
272 Id. (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 918) (emphasis added).  
273 Id. at 745. 
274 Id. at 754 (noting the “history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution” 
supported the Court’s decision).  
275 Id. at 757.  
276 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1164 n.21 
(N.D. Fla. 2010).  
277 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 4/10/2012 1:40:11 PM 
564 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:2 
This section discusses the logical flaws of a presumption of 
invalidity for novel governmental actions. The first issue, explained 
by Justice Harlan above, is that tradition is a living thing. It did not 
die in 1789. American society has changed drastically since then and 
will continue to change in the future. Second, what the history books 
actually reveal is debatable, if not completely unclear. Such debate 
invites the advocate—even the judge—to employ, consciously or not, 
his or her own values and preferences to resolve it. The problem is 
most obvious when political questions, purportedly decided long ago, 
are “constitutionalized” by unelected Supreme Court justices. 
Resolution of a historic debate about what the founders intended or 
meant by non-historian Supreme Court justices should not decide 
concrete cases that deal with today’s issues. That problem is then 
compounded when the debate is whether the page is blank, which 
elicits the third issue: As a practical matter, how is silence read? 
Supreme Court justices cannot read the minds of our ancestors. Nor 
can they read the collective minds of every member of Congress until 
the unprecedented action was taken to ascertain why Congress waited. 
Lastly, though perhaps most problematic, a presumption of invalidity 
inverts the principle that the Court should defer to its coordinate 
branches’ actions. This section concludes that a presumption of 
invalidity is untenable and should be avoided.  
A. The Dynamic Conception of Tradition 
That first issue is history’s enduring and dynamic nature—indeed, 
“tradition is a living thing.”278 This Note does not argue that the 
Constitution should be construed as a living document. The argument 
here is narrow: history—which is dynamic and evolves over time—
should not be fixed at 1789 by the Court; doing so effectively 
murders tradition in cold blood. A novel government action subjected 
to a presumption of invalidity is as dead as the abacus, the typewriter, 
and the Atari. The difference is that the novel government action is 
likely to deal with new issues caused by new technology, which was 
the death knell for things like the Atari.  
The case of the Atari provides a helpful example. As one of the 
first companies to develop a video game system, Atari marketed 
games such as Asteroids and Pong. Those types of games did not 
require government regulation regarding distribution of violent 
content to minors. Fast forward roughly forty years, and there are 
major concerns with games like Grand Theft Auto and Postal 2.279 
                                                                                                                  
278 Id. 
279 See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson et al., Violent Video Game Effects on Aggression, 
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Those games, which, among other things, allow the user to “pour 
gasoline over [victims], set them on fire, and urinate on them,”280 are 
cause for concern when placed in the hands of highly impressionable, 
young children. Attempting to deal with that problem, California 
passed a law that prevents children from purchasing, without their 
guardian’s consent, such violent video games.281  
Is that law constitutional? Or does it violate the video game 
maker’s (or the child’s) First Amendment rights? The law is novel 
and unprecedented: no legislature, state or federal, has ever placed 
restrictions on the distribution of violent expression. But that fact 
reveals very little about the law’s constitutionality. Video games that 
allow the user to perform violent and sadistic actions to virtual 
humans were not available to our Founding Fathers’ children.282 
Indeed, such games were not available until very recently. There is no 
way of knowing what the founders, or anyone in 1789, would have 
thought about restricting children’s access to these games. 
But that is the precise question the unprecedented argument elicits: 
“Was there any indication that anybody thought, when the First 
Amendment was adopted, that there . . . was an exception to it for . . . 
speech regarding violence?”283 That question is unhelpful because 
there is nothing in history, especially in pre-1800, even remotely 
similar to Grand Theft Auto or Postal 2. A person could make threats 
or falsely yell fire in a crowded parlor, but those utterances are not 
                                                                                                                  
 
Empathy, and Prosocial Behavior in Eastern and Western Countries: A Meta-Analytic Review, 
136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 151, 171 (2010) (noting that societal “debates can and should finally move 
beyond the simple question of whether violent video game play is a causal risk factor for 
aggressive behavior; the scientific literature has effectively and clearly shown the answer to be 
‘yes.’”); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 app. at 2771–79 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (compiling lists of studies that support that violent video games are 
harmful, in Appendix A, and refute that contention, in Appendix B, with the vast majority of 
studies supporting rather than refuting the proposition).  
280 Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S.Ct. 
2729 (2011) No. 08–1448 (Roberts, C.J.).  
281 See CAL. CIV. CODE §1746.1 (West 2009) (“A person may not sell or rent a video game 
that has been labeled as a violent video game to a minor.”). The Supreme Court held the 
requirement unconstitutional in Entm’t Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2741–42. 
282 Justice Alito pointed this out in oral argument when counsel was asked by Justice 
Scalia if there was any history at the time of the framing to support the law. See supra note 41 
for the exchange.  
283 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 281, at 17 (Scalia, J.). Note, that while this 
Note advocates against using the law’s novelty to strike it down (i.e., not asking the question 
Scalia asked in oral argument), that point does not suggest that the law is constitutional merely 
because there is a new problem. It may well be overbroad, vague, or simply violate First 
Amendment principles. See, e.g., Entm’t Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2742–42 (Alito, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (finding that the law was impermissible vague, but leaving open the possibility 
that a narrower drawn law could be constitutional). There may be issues with line drawing (e.g., 
are movies next?). But the law should not be dead on arrival merely because it is new.  
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protected speech.284 One could paint a violent picture or write a 
violent book, but there was no medium to express—or act out—
violence like Xbox or PlayStation, especially one marketed towards 
the young. The First Amendment rights of the purveyors of such 
violent expression (or of children playing the games) were never 
debated. The conclusion follows that laws were never passed to 
curtail those rights. Despite the historic dearth of violent video games, 
the Supreme Court found that there was no traditional First 
Amendment exception for violent expression (analogizing games like 
Postal 2 to Snow White and Cinderella), subjected the California law 
to strict scrutiny, and invalidated it.285 Whether the law passes 
constitutional muster should not depend on such an arbitrary inquiry 
that can only have one answer. 
B. Law-Office History Applied 
Even if the presumption of invalidity is appropriate, the issue of 
ambiguous history—and the Court’s struggle with historical 
accuracy—remains. It is one thing for Justices to debate the meaning 
and import of the Court’s own decisions.286 That is their expertise. 
But with respect to historical assertions of fact, there is cause for 
concern. The problem was recognized by historian Alfred H. Kelly in 
1965.287 Judges are ill-equipped to decide historical questions in 
general. That concern is amplified when the historical assertion is 
what did not happen or was not said, especially when there is valid 
disagreement.  
This is not to say there is no place for history. Demonstrated in 
Part I and reiterated here, history can be extremely informative of, for 
example, what works, what does not, and what is good, bad, or ugly. 
The Court, however, must be candid and objective when it uses 
history as authority.288 If the historical facts are clearly contradicted 
or ambiguous, the Court should follow the lead of one of its most 
                                                                                                                  
284 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (per curium) (holding that true 
threats are unprotected speech, but not political hyperbole that contains a threat); Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (acting under the pre-Brandenburg formulation of the 
clear and present danger test, noting that a person could not falsely yell fire in a crowded theatre 
with constitutional immunity).  
285 Entm’t Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2741–42 (invalidating the legislation because was 
underinclusive for allowing a parental veto, and overinclusive because it violates the First 
Amendment rights of young people). 
286 See supra note 19 (discussing Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) and the majority and dissent’s disagreement over which 
decision comports with the Court’s famous holding in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954)). 
287 See supra Part I.C (discussing law-office history). 
288 This argument is expanded in Part IV infra.  
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noteworthy opinions: Brown v. Board of Education.289 In 1953, when 
the Court ordered re-argument,290 it asked about the history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, specifically, whether the framers of the 
amendment intended to outlaw segregation or thought that a future 
Court could do so.291 Kelly, who assisted writing the NAACP’s brief 
for re-argument, noted that the result was “elaborate pieces of law-
office history” on both sides.292 The Court’s response—the correct 
one—was to dismiss the history as inconclusive.293 Kelly’s “half-
educated guess” was “that the competing briefs exposed too grossly 
. . . the entire fallacy of law-office history.”294 Whether or not that 
was the Court’s reasoning, today’s Court should take heed. The 
modern Court’s opinions—and attacks in footnotes—demonstrate the 
embarrassment the Court saved itself from in Brown.  
For example, in Printz the Court took fourteen pages to assert that 
commandeering state and local executives was a novel exercise of 
power.295 First, did the framers mention it? In Federalist 27, Hamilton 
noted: “The plan reported by the convention, by extending the 
authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several 
States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy 
of each, in the execution of its laws.”296 Later, in the same paragraph, 
Hamilton stated: 
It merits particular attention . . . that the laws of the 
Confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of 
its jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; 
                                                                                                                  
289 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
290 See FELDMAN, supra note 99, at 371–405, for an interesting discussion of the reasoning 
for re-argument. Feldman recounts Chief Justice Warren’s wish to issue a unanimous opinion 
and the need to convince some justices (or outlive them). Id. at 399–400. 
291 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953) (order for re-argument) (stating 
the first question as, “1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the State 
legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not 
contemplate, understood or did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public 
schools?”). 
292 Kelly, supra note 20, at 144. 
293 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–93 (“In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock 
back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was 
written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present 
place in American life throughout the Nation.”); Kelly, supra note 20, at 144 (“[T]he Court 
rejected history in favor of sociology.”).  
294 Kelly, supra note 20, at 145.  
295 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905–18. The Printz majority’s painting of history 
is criticized elsewhere. See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 36, at 963–73 (criticizing the Printz 
majority’s use of history); Evan R. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 
1084 (2002) (describing the “seemingly biased interpretation of historical materials considered 
by the Justices in rendering their decision”).  
296 THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra note 101, at 136 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis 
added). 
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to the observance of which all officers, legislative, executive, 
and judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an 
oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the 
respective members, will be incorporated into the operations 
of the national government as far as its just and 
constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered 
auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.297 
Those passages seem clear enough. At a minimum, Hamilton’s 
discussion showed that the governmental action taken in Printz was 
not thought forbidden. The majority discounted Hamilton’s essays as 
coming “from the pen of the most expansive expositor of federal 
power.”298 According to Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, “[t]o 
choose Hamilton’s view, as Justice Souter [dissenting] would, is to 
turn a blind eye to the fact that it was Madison’s—not Hamilton’s—
that prevailed.”299 
So apparently the question is: What did Madison think? In 
Federalist 44, responding to the question of why state executives and 
legislators must be bound by oath to the Constitution, Madison stated, 
“The members and officers of the State governments . . . will have an 
essential agency in giving effect to the federal Constitution.”300 
Madison went on to note that the election of federal officers 
necessarily depended on the states.301 In Federalist 45, Madison, after 
discussing the limited number of federal employees, noted, “[i]ndeed 
it is extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly in the 
organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States will be 
clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union.”302 The 
position is somewhat ambiguous, but it does not support the assertion 
that Madison viewed commandeering state executives prohibited by 
the Constitution. Indeed, four Justices—and commentators—read the 
history quite differently than the Printz majority.303  
                                                                                                                  
297 Id. at 136–37.  
298 Printz, 521 U.S. at 915 n.9.  
299 Id.  
300 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 101, at 233 (James Madison).  
301 Id. 
302 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 101, at 237 (James Madison). 
303 See, e.g.¸ Printz, 521 U.S. at 954 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting): 
Indeed, despite the exhaustive character of the Court’s response to this dissent, it has 
failed to find even an iota of evidence that any of the Framers of the Constitution or 
any Member of Congress who supported or opposed the statutes discussed in the text 
ever expressed doubt as to the power of Congress to impose federal responsibilities 
on local judges or police officers. 
see also, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to Clio: The Historical Continuity from the 
Articles of Confederation into the Constitution, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 512 (2004) (noting 
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That “none of these statements necessarily implies . . . that 
Congress could impose the[] responsibilities without the consent of 
the States”304 is true. That formulation, whether the Federalist Papers 
necessarily imply the power, is far too narrow. Even discounting 
Hamilton’s view, simply because Madison was ambiguous in the 
Federalist Papers should not strip Congress of a power. Thus, it is 
appropriate to inquire, as both the majority and dissent did, into 
historical practice because evidence of historical thought is 
ambiguous.  
As evidence of historical practice to the contrary, the majority 
cited an early law that recommended state legislatures allow federal 
prisoners to be housed in state jails with which Georgia refused to 
comply.305 That incident only shows that the federal government 
made the political decision to rent a jail in Georgia to house its 
prisoners.306 Asserting that the action implies acknowledgement of a 
lack of power to compel is identical to “reliance upon unexpressed 
legislative intent.”307 Moreover, there are other early statutes that 
seemed to bolster the government’s position that commandeering was 
constitutional: for example, for the transportation of fugitives;308 for 
determination of the condition of seafaring vessels;309 and for 
requiring state courts and court clerks to perform naturalization 
services.310 To distinguish those acts, the majority narrowed them to 
mere adjudicatory functions performed by courts rather than the 
executive functions performed by government agencies.311 Justice 
Stevens in dissent, however, noted that some of those statutes 
required courts to act like contemporary regulatory agencies.312 But 
                                                                                                                  
 
that “the national government can legitimately commandeer state officials under the original 
meaning of the Constitution, because commandeering was a necessary tool under the Articles 
and because the Framers assumed that the commandeering would continue”); Saikrishna 
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2004 (1993) (“The 
ratification history indicates that both the Constitution’s supporters and detractors understood 
that state officers could be called into federal service. In other words, delegates who voted for or 
against the Constitution may have been aware that the federal government possessed the 
authority to commandeer state officers.”). 
304 Printz, 521 U.S. at 910–11 (emphasis added). 
305 Id. at 909–10.  
306 See id at 910 (noting that when Georgia failed to comply with the request that the 
federal government rented a temporary jail until the completion of the permanent one). 
307 SCALIA, supra note 48, at 21 (discussing the ills of searching for legislative intent).  
308 Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793). 
309 Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 131(1790). 
310 Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790). 
311 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 908 n.2 (noting that “[n]one of the early statutes directed to state 
judges or court clerks required the performance of functions more appropriately characterized as 
executive than judicial . . . ”). 
312 See id. at 950–51 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that an early law requiring state 
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the majority chastised Justice Stevens for “mistak[ing] the copy for 
the original, . . . [by believing] that 18th-century courts were imitating 
agencies, rather than 20th-century agencies imitating courts.”313 But 
what is a label but a label? If either the twentieth-century agency or 
eighteenth-century court was administering the law it is nonetheless 
an executive function.314  
The Brady Act is not the only modern statute that requires this 
“cooperative federalism.”315 The Court dismissed the modern statutes 
because “[t]heir persuasive force is far outweighed by almost two 
centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the practice.”316  
This Note’s purpose is not to prove the Printz majority or 
dissenting opinion’s view of the history books. That task—if it can 
even be achieved—is best suited for a professional historian. The 
objective is to show that the history is unclear. The infamous 
“decision of 1789” provides another example.317 Printz, Alden, 
Myers, and Free Enterprise Fund illustrate the danger of affording 
historical silence such great weight in constitutional adjudication. The 
familiar adage that “history is written by the victors”318 describes the 
issue well. Ambiguous history, with “more or less apt quotations from 
respected sources on each side of any question,” 319 invites judges to 
fill in the gaps, or choose sides, based on political or policy 
preferences.  
When the assertion is that the history books are silent, there are 
two gaps that must be filled: the ambiguity (i.e., that in fact nothing 
was said or done) and the negative inference from the silence (i.e., 
that the silence means that some action cannot be done). The extra 
leap compounds the problem of law-office history. If historical 
silence—indeed, intensely debated silence—yields a presumption of 
invalidity, then the dead hand of the past assumes an authoritative 
                                                                                                                  
 
courts to “certify[] the seaworthiness of vessels” required those courts “to serve, functionally, 
like contemporary regulatory agencies” in that “[t]he statute set forth . . . procedures for an 
expert inquisitorial proceeding, supervised by a judge but otherwise more characteristic of 
executive activity”).  
313 Id. at 909 n.2 (majority opinion).  
314 Indeed, the text of the naturalization statute required the court to administer the oath 
and record the application. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (requiring courts to 
administer the oath and the clerk of court to record the application).  
315 See Nichol, supra note 36, at 966 n.106 (listing other modern examples).  
316 Printz, 521 U.S. at 918.  
317 See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the “decision of 1789.” 
318 Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 275 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
319 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634–35 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring).  
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position over the living that cannot be justified in a modern, ever 
changing society. 
C. Law-Office History and Blank Pages 
The issue discussed above is the difficulty in determining what the 
history books actually reveal. That issue is present whenever history 
is used as authority. Indeed, it is a reason to limit the weight given to 
history. When history is silent, the concern is amplified. Printz and 
Alden, which not only weigh historical silence heavily but also 
negatively, exhibit the flaws of the unprecedented argument. The 
conclusion in Printz, later reiterated in Alden, was that the 
unprecedented nature of the action “tend[ed] to negate the existence 
of the congressional power asserted . . . .”320 That conclusion raises 
two questions: (1) even if the unprecedented nature is uncontroverted, 
why is the import negative; and (2) how can the import be a 
presumption of invalidity when congressional laws are typically 
presumed to be valid (in other words, why is the import two “clicks” 
towards invalidity rather than just one)? The former question is 
addressed here, the latter in the next section and more fully in Part IV.  
1. Printz and the Highly Attractive Power 
If it was clear that the Brady Act was the first time since the 
Constitution’s ratification that Congress enlisted state executives into 
service by compulsion, then that novelty could mean one of two 
things: (1) Congress historically thought that it did not have the power 
to do so; or (2) Congress has yet to find it necessary and proper to do 
so. The Printz Court found that the historical import was the 
former.321 But the latter conclusion is both consistent with judicial 
deference and the presumption of validity, and has greater support in 
the country’s history. To support the conclusion that the lack of 
historical precedent equals a lack of power, Justice Scalia denotes the 
power to compel state executives to carry out federal law as a “highly 
attractive power.”322 That seems like a reasonable argument: A young 
child does not drive a car—despite the attractiveness of untamed 
mobility—because he or she does not have the power or cannot drive 
the car, perhaps because the child too small, has no license, or is not 
permitted to do so by his or her parents.  
                                                                                                                  
320 Printz, 521 U.S. at 918.  
321 See id.(finding that the lack of congressional action “tends to negate the existence of the 
congressional power asserted”). 
322 Id. at 905; see also id. at 908 (noting “the attractiveness of that course to Congress”).  
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The attractiveness of driving is obvious. A typical teenager cannot 
wait until the day her parents let her behind the wheel. The 
attractiveness of commandeering state and local executives, on the 
other hand, is less clear. The Constitution was not this country’s first 
attempt to unify the several states. In 1781, the states ratified the 
Articles of Confederation, which “established a central government 
for the United States . . . [where] the States retained most of their 
sovereignty, like independent nations bound together only by 
treaties.”323 Unlike the Constitution, the Articles gave the central 
government no power directly over the people, only over the states 
themselves.324 And “[t]o put its laws into effect, the Continental 
Congress had to impress state officials and local committees.”325 
Indeed, the opponents of the Constitution supported that method.326 If 
the embarrassments of the Articles precipitated the Constitution’s 
ratification, why is a power that proved inefficient and inadequate 
“highly attractive” to Congress post-1789?327 If the hypothetical child 
stole his father’s keys and went for a drive, but crashed the car and 
ended up seriously injured, it is unlikely that driving would be 
“highly attractive” a few weeks after she left the hospital. It is 
similarly disingenuous to attach a negative inference to congressional 
avoidance of a practice that proved inefficient and cumbersome pre-
1789.  
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Printz, provided a persuasive 
political-process rationale for the purported absence of historical 
practice.328 Justice Stevens noted:  
                                                                                                                  
323 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 9 (1964). 
324 Id. (“It soon became clear that the Confederation was without adequate power to collect 
needed revenues or to enforce the rules its Congress adopted.”).  
325 Johnson, supra note 304, at 484 (emphasis added). 
326 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra note 101, at 136 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that 
the league contended for by the opponents only would have authority to “operate upon the 
States in their political or collective capacities”). 
327 Implicit in that question is the question of whether the federal government gave up the 
power over the states by gaining power over private individuals. On this point compare Printz, 
521 U.S. at 945 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The basic change in the character of the government 
that the Framers conceived was designed to enhance the power of the National Government, not 
to provide some new, unmentioned immunity for state officers.”), and Johnson, supra note 304, 
at 473 (“The national government was to have all of the powers under the Constitution that it 
had under the Articles of Confederation, plus more.”), with Printz, 521 U.S. at 920 n.10 
(quoting Prakash, supra note 304, at 1972) (asserting that “‘[w]here the Constitution intends that 
our Congress enjoy a power once vested in the Continental Congress, it specifically grants it.’”) 
Both accounts are of the “law-office” variety and both are plausible explanations. The inference 
this Note draws from the transition is simpler: why would a power that everybody concluded 
was inadequate to fully govern the several states, as sovereigns, be highly attractive shortly after 
vast new powers are bestowed? Even if the inference that the power would be unattractive is too 
much, the Court’s inference—that the power was highly attractive—is also too much.  
328 Printz, 521 U.S. at 953 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Indeed, an entirely appropriate concern for the prerogatives of 
state government readily explains Congress’ sparing use of 
this otherwise “highly attractive” . . . power. Congress’ 
discretion, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, indicates not 
that the power does not exist, but rather that the interests of 
the States are more than sufficiently protected by their 
participation in the National Government.329  
The political-process rationale is simple: because Congress represents 
the people of the several states and is accountable to them “it is quite 
unrealistic to assume that they will ignore the sovereignty concerns of 
their constituents.”330 Whether the political process alone is sufficient 
to uphold the Brady Act is another question. The point here is that the 
political nature of the decision to enlist state bureaucracies shows one 
reason why Congress would shy away from using the commandeering 
power.331 Either the states’ interests in being free from federal 
mandates or the efficiency of having the federal executive branch 
administer federal law could have been the reason that Congress has 
rarely commandeered state executives. Whatever the reason for 
Congress’s hesitation, the Court should not infer that it was because 
Congress assumed it lacked the power.  
2. Sherlock Holmes and the Constitution 
The Court’s state sovereign immunity decision in Alden also drew 
a negative inference from historical silence.332 There, too, the 
inference was misguided. In Alden, the unprecedented nature of the 
question is less controversial. The dissent and majority disagreed 
principally about the import of that historical silence. The majority, 
citing Printz,333 decided it was negative.334  
                                                                                                                  
329 Id. at 953 n.12 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
330 Id. at 956. But see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.9 
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that recent political and structural changes “have made 
Congress increasingly less representative of state and local interests, and more likely to be 
responsive to the demands of various national constituencies”).  
331 See Erik M. Jensen & Jonathan L. Entin, Commandeering, the Tenth Amendment, and 
the Federal Requisition Power: New York v. United States Revisited, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 
355, 379 (1998) (asserting a similar point regarding requisitions and noting, “[w]hether or not a 
system of requisitions is a good idea—and most founders thought not—it is not necessarily 
unconstitutional”). 
332 See supra notes 255–77 and accompanying text for a discussion of Alden.  
333 Alden cites Printz for the proposition that the absence of historical “practice” elicits a 
negative inference. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 744 (1999).  
334 Id. at 745. The import in Printz and Alden, when looked at from the state’s perspective, 
is actually positive. As in, the import grants the State’s rights that are not enshrined in the text of 
the Constitution or affirmatively granted to them by history.  
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The Court in Alden advanced the following justifications for a 
negative inference regarding the historical silence in the debate: (1) 
the heavily indebted states at the time of the framing; (2) the creative 
opponents to ratification; and (3) “the furor raised by Chisholm, and 
the speed and unanimity with which the [Eleventh] Amendment was 
adopted.”335 The argument—made by Justice Kennedy in oral 
argument336 and again, albeit less explicit, in his opinion337—is that 
the “dog didn’t bark” during the convention and therefore state 
sovereign immunity must have survived it.  
As mentioned earlier, that analogy is to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s 
short story Silver Blaze, in which Silver Blaze, a famous race horse, 
disappeared from its stable and its trainer, John Straker, was 
murdered.338 Sherlock Holmes, tasked with solving the crime, soon 
learned that the dog kept in Silver Blaze’s stable did not bark on the 
night of the incident.339 That led Holmes to conclude that “the 
midnight visitor was someone whom the dog knew well.”340 It was 
Straker himself who removed Silver Blaze from the stable, not his 
assailant.341  
The inference’s applicability to the Founders—as dogs, guarding 
state sovereign immunity—is tenuous, at best. Justice Kennedy 
supposes that the anti-federalists would have “barked” if they thought 
the Constitution altered the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.342 
The main flaw is the ambiguity as to why the “dog” stayed silent. One 
possibility is, as the Alden Court concluded, that the Constitution did 
not alter state sovereign immunity. That conclusion presupposes that 
there is something (a Silver Blaze) for the anti-federalists (the dog) to 
protect. For the negative inference to be appropriate, that object must 
be constitutional or inherent state sovereign immunity, not a common 
law doctrine that could be modified by later legislators.  
But there is no evidence that the framers intended to 
constitutionalize the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity in 
the first instance.343 Furthermore, “the Framers chose to recognize 
                                                                                                                  
335 Id. at 741–743. The Court’s reasoning is discussed more fully in supra notes 255–77 
and accompanying text..  
336 See supra note 263 for Justice Kennedy’s assertion in Alden’s oral argument.  
337 See supra text accompanying note 262–63.  
338 DOYLE, supra note 271, at 3.  
339 Id. at 23. 
340 Id. at 27. 
341 Id. Holmes’s ultimate conclusion regarding Straker’s death is that Silver Blaze killed 
him by a kick when Straker attempted to operate on the horse. Id. at 29. Straker was up to no 
good, and wanted to cut one of the horse’s tendons before a race to pay off a debt. Id. at 27–28. 
342 See supra note 263 for Justice Kennedy’s assertion in Alden’s oral argument.  
343 Explained by Justice Souter dissenting:  
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only particular common-law concepts, such as the writ of habeas 
corpus . . . and the distinction between law and equity . . . by specific 
reference in the constitutional text.”344 Indeed, if the doctrine of state 
sovereign immunity was so well ingrained, two puzzling questions 
remain. First, how could four justices in Chisholm v. Georgia345 
conclude that a citizen could sue a state without any abrogation of 
immunity by Congress?346 And second, though Alden cited the rapid 
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment after Chisholm in support of the 
negative inference,347 why were the framers of that amendment not 
explicitly clear that states have sovereign immunity, and that the 
sovereign immunity cannot be abrogated by the supreme federal 
government?  
Perhaps, as in Silver Blaze, the dog stayed silent because it knew 
the intruder; the anti-federalists knew the Constitution would give 
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. The 
principal problem with the “dog that doesn’t bark” argument is that it 
attempts to read our ancestors’ minds from a blank slate and in doing 
so presupposes the conclusion.348  
Extracting hard conclusions from silence suffers from worse 
analytical flaws than the traditional version of law-office history (i.e., 
the cherry-picking of favorable facts). Perhaps the “dog” stayed silent 
because it accepted the Constitution’s revocation of state sovereign 
                                                                                                                  
 
[Such] silence does not tell us that the Framers’ generation thought the prerogative 
so well settled as to be an inherent right of States, and not a common law creation. It 
says only that at the conventions, the issue was not on the participants’ minds 
because the nature of sovereignty was not always explicitly addressed.  
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 772–73 n.12 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added).  
344 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 137–38 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VII). 
345 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI. 
346 See id. at 479 (holding, in a 4–1 decision that Georgia was subject to a collection suit by 
the executor of the creditor’s estate). 
347 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 743 (stating that “the furor raised by Chisholm, and the speed 
and unanimity with which the [Eleventh] Amendment was adopted . . . underscore the jealous 
care with which the founding generation sought to preserve the sovereign immunity of the 
States”). 
348 The “dog that doesn’t bark” argument has been criticized by members of the Court 
when used to ascertain what present day members of Congress intended. See Harrison v. PPG 
Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980) (“In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, 
in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark.”). But see 
City of Rancho Palos Verdes, v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 132 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991) (“The Court has 
endorsed the view that Congress’ silence on questions such as this one ‘can be likened to the 
dog that did not bark.’”). 
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immunity. Perhaps the “dog” assumed that states had immunity from 
suits unless Congress said otherwise. Whatever the reason for the 
“dog’s” silence, the attribution of such a strong state sovereign 
immunity conception suggests that the conclusion came first, and the 
argument second. Even if that is not the case, use of the framers’ 
silence to suppress the current Congress’s power is unwise.  
The Court’s negative inference based on historical silence was 
problematic in both Printz and Alden. The next Part discusses the 
magnitude of the inference, a further layer compounding the problem.  
D. Presumption of Restraint 
In Blodgett v. Holden,349 Justice Holmes remarked, “when this 
Court [undertakes] to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional, I 
suppose that we all agree that to do so is the gravest and most delicate 
duty that this Court is called on to perform.”350 Cases like Printz, 
Alden, and Free Enterprise Fund suggest that the current Court no 
longer agrees with Justice Holmes. Even assuming that the Court was 
justified to draw a negative inference in those cases, how can that 
inference rise to the level of a presumption of invalidity when 
Congress’s actions are “presume[d] in favour of its validity, until its 
violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable 
doubt.”351 In Justice Stone’s famous footnote in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.,352 he made no exception for laws that burden 
states’ rights.353 Perhaps around 1980, when National League of 
Cities v. Usery354 was not yet discredited, such an exception to the 
presumption may have been justified if a law infringed on the states 
as states.355 Garcia seems to have laid that question to rest.356 Even if 
                                                                                                                  
349 275 U.S. 142 (1927).  
350 Id. at 147–48. 
351 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827); see also Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 956 n.17 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“‘Whenever called upon to judge 
the constitutionality of an Act of Congress—‘the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court 
is called upon to perform,’ Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.)—the 
Court accords ‘great weight to the decisions of Congress.’ Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 
v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973).’” (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 
453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981)).  
352 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
353 See id. at 152 n.4 (Stone, J.) (discussing situations when there is a “narrower scope for 
operation of the presumption of constitutionality . . . ”). 
354 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 
U.S. 528 (1985).  
355 See id. at 855 (holding that the federal government cannot regulate an “integral portion 
of . . . governmental services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally 
afforded their citizens”).  
356 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (“State 
sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the 
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the Court meant for its presumption of invalidity to be limited to 
federalism issues, the language does not support that conclusion.357  
Thus, the issue is, assuming a negative inference could or should 
be drawn from silence, why does the inference move two “clicks” 
towards invalidity? A much more defensible position would be to 
defer slightly less to the congressional or executive judgment when 
reviewing novel actions. The Court must never forget that: 
In striking the balance the relevant considerations must be 
fairly, which means coolly, weighed with due regard to the 
fact that this Court is not exercising a primary judgment but is 
sitting in judgment upon those who also have taken the oath 
to observe the Constitution and who have the responsibility 
for carrying on government.358  
The next Part elaborates on the competing presumption of validity 
most congressional actions should be entitled to and the appropriate 
level of doubt, if any, the novelty of a law should carry.  
IV. REVIEWING NOVEL ACTIONS: CANDID RESTRAINT 
This Part sketches a blueprint for reviewing novel actions. In aid 
of that task, the first section reviews instances where the Court’s use 
of historical silence was more justifiable. The next section, with these 
contrasting situations in mind, discusses the analytical steps a court 
should take to evaluate the “unprecedented” argument. Analyzed 
candidly, with the appropriate level of deference and a keen sense of 
judicial restraint, the “unprecedented” argument loses much of the 
force allotted to it by Printz and Alden. This Note concludes by 
returning to the individual mandate, which opponents of the policy 
have forcefully contended has no prior precedent, 359 and suggests that 
attention should be shifted away from the unprecedented question.  
                                                                                                                  
 
structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.”). 
357 See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1164 n.21 
(N.D. Fla. 2010) (noting there may be presumption of invalidity for the novel individual 
mandate, which regulates individuals, not states).  
358 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring). 
359 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (providing examples of claims by opponents of 
the individual mandate that it is unprecedented and an unconstitutional expansion of federal 
power).  
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A. Clio’s Gentler Side 
In the landmark prior restraint case Near v. Minnesota ex rel. 
Olson,360 the Court was faced with a Minnesota law that imposed a 
prior restraint on publication. After an analysis of the law’s effect and 
a discussion of uncontroverted historical evidence that prior restraints 
were considered problematic by the framers, towards the end of the 
opinion, the Court stated: “The fact that for approximately one 
hundred and fifty years there has been almost an entire absence of 
attempts to impose previous restraints upon publications relating to 
the malfeasance of public officers is significant of the deep-seated 
conviction that such restraints would violate constitutional right.”361 
Though Chief Justice Hughes’s statement sounds similar to Printz, 
taken in context, it is more justifiable.362 The First Amendment is 
vague and does not explicitly state: “no prior restraints.”363 Because 
of that ambiguity, the Court found it necessary to consider “the 
conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and 
guaranteed.”364  
The history—the intention of the framers and historical practice—
was much less ambiguous than the Court’s current expeditions into 
the history books. Indeed, the dissenters did not argue the majority 
looked at the wrong history; they argued that “[t]he Minnesota statute 
does not operate as a previous restraint on publication within the 
proper meaning of that phrase.”365 The disagreement was policy 
based.366 The Court quoted Blackstone’s view: “‘The liberty of the 
press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists 
in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom 
from censure for criminal matter when published.’”367 Blackstone’s 
                                                                                                                  
360 283 U.S. 697 (1931).  
361 Id. at 718. 
362 Near was nevertheless a narrow majority. But the disagreement was not about the 
history. Further, it was clear that neither the majority nor dissent would have rested its 
conclusion on history. The dissent did, however, argue that the Court’s decision was without 
prior precedent. See id. at 723 (Butler, J., dissenting) (stating that the decision “put upon the 
States a federal restriction that is without precedent”).  
363 The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend I. 
364 Near, 283 U.S. at 713.  
365 Id. at 735 (Butler, J., dissenting).  
366 See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 377 (1941) (noting 
that the “dissenting opinion emphasized the practical need for such legislation”). The dissent 
did, however, argue that Joseph Story agreed with their formulation that a previous restraint is 
authorized if the publication is “duly adjudged to constitute a nuisance.” Near, 283 U.S. at 735 
(Butler, J., dissenting).  
367 Near, 283 U.S. at 713 (quoting 5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52). 
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formulation was echoed by Madison.368 The Court’s well-supported 
conclusion was: “The exceptional nature of its limitations places in a 
strong light the general conception that liberty of the press, 
historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has 
meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous 
restraints or censorship.”369  
Another reason less deference should be afforded to the legislature 
is that the action was challenged under the First Amendment. The 
presumption of validity takes a narrower scope when laws that 
directly infringe on explicit constitutional rights, such as the freedom 
of the press, are reviewed.370 The Minnesota law in Near allowed 
public officials to suppress “charges against public officers of official 
dereliction . . . unless the owner or publisher is able . . . to satisfy the 
judge that the charges are true and are published with good motives 
and for justifiable ends.”371 Not only is that law vague, but it is the 
antithesis of a free press. One principal purpose of the press is to 
expose and bring to light dereliction of duty by public officials.372 
Less deference to the legislature—one group of public officials the 
law would protect—is entirely appropriate. It would not go too far to 
say that the Minnesota law was a self-interested transaction by the 
legislature.  
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Court’s reasoning was 
clear that the decision did not hinge on the novelty of the act in 
question. The novelty of Minnesota’s law did not render it 
                                                                                                                  
 
See also CHAFEE, supra note 367, at 9–12 for a discussion of how Blackstone’s theory “dies 
hard,” and noting that the conception is inadequate on two fronts: an unlimited freedom from 
previous restraints “goes altogether too far in restricting state action,” and “[o]n the other hand, 
. . . the Blackstonian definition gives very inadequate protection to the freedom of expression.” 
Chafee does, however, note that “nobody has objected that immunity from previous restraints 
does not deserve special emphasis.” Id. at 379.  
368 See Near, 283 U.S. at 714 (noting Madison’s view that freedom of the press requires 
freedom from previous restraints).  
369 Id. at 716.  
370 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153–54 n.4 (1938) (citing 
Near, 283 U.S. at 713–714, 718–720, 722) (recognizing less deference when the law is a 
“restraint[] upon the dissemination of information”).  
371 Near, 283 U.S. at 713 (emphasis added). 
372 See id. at 718–20 (noting that “[p]ublic officers[’] . . . character and conduct remain[s] 
open to debate and free discussion in the press”); id. at 719–20: 
[T]he administration of government has become more complex, the opportunities for 
malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, crime has grown to most serious 
proportions, and the danger of its protection by unfaithful officials and of the 
impairment of the fundamental security of life and property by criminal alliances and 
official neglect, emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press, 
especially in the great cities. 
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presumptively invalid; the fact that the law operated as “the essence 
of censorship” was the nail in the coffin.373 The novelty of the action 
was merely the last layer of dirt on the grave. 
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the Steel Seizure case, asserted 
that:  
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to 
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, 
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the 
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of 
the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on 
“executive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.374  
That formulation contemplates the use of Congress’s historic silence 
to vest power in the President, thereby reducing the powers of 
Congress.375 But Frankfurter was clear that “long-continued 
acquiescence of Congress . . . ” is required,376 a position different 
than that advanced in Printz and Alden. Here, Justice Kennedy’s “dog 
that doesn’t bark” argument has more force.377 If Presidents have 
acted as if they possess a certain power for a long period, Congress 
would undoubtedly be aware of it. That awareness would alert 
Congress that it is in danger of losing the power to control that aspect 
of the executive branch.378 Such awareness is presupposed by 
acquiescence.  
When matters of national policy are concerned, there is no alert 
that Congress could lose a power by failing to use that power. For 
example, in Printz there was no reason for Congress to believe that by 
not commandeering state and local executives it would lose the power 
to do so in the future. Further, there was nobody (i.e., society, a 
branch of government, or the states) relying on Congress’s lack of 
exertion. Questions regarding the balance of power between Congress 
                                                                                                                  
373Id. at 713. 
374 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the claim 
and acquiescence theory, which holds that long standing congressional or executive practice 
suggests that the practice is constitutional).  
375 The loss of power is also different than a scope of federal power case. If the “gloss” was 
inferred onto the President’s powers, thereby removing an aspect of control from the Congress’s 
ambit, the federal government as a whole is not precluded from exercising some power. 
Congress is only restricted from controlling the President.  
376 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 613 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
377 See supra note 263 and accompanying text for Justice Kennedy’s assertion in Alden’s 
oral argument. 
378 Cf. Steel Seizure., 343 U.S. at 635–636 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting the possibility 
of implied powers of the President). 
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and the President are far more complex. As Frankfurter noted at the 
beginning of his concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case: 
Before the cares of the White House were his own, President 
Harding is reported to have said that government after all is a 
very simple thing. He must have said that, if he said it, as a 
fleeting inhabitant of fairyland. The opposite is the truth. A 
constitutional democracy like ours is perhaps the most 
difficult of man’s social arrangements to manage 
successfully.379 
Frankfurter’s position, in conjunction with his expertise in history and 
stalwart sense of judicial restraint, is a defensible position indeed.  
The Supreme Court’s conception of and inferences drawn from the 
“decision of 1789” provides an example of Frankfurter’s reasoning 
gone awry.380 The original meaning and Congress’s historic practice 
is far from clear. The Court’s recent revival of the Myers Court’s 
questionable conception of the “decision of 1789” exhibits the flaws 
of law-office history. It also shows the need for the principles of 
candor, consistency, and restraint when the Court elevates history—
especially the absence thereof—to have a binding effect.  
B. Candid Restraint 
This Note proposes two principles for reviewing novel actions: 
candor and consistency. Those principles, applied with a philosophy 
of judicial restraint, are exceedingly important in a time when society 
is evolving and changing more rapidly than ever before. Amazing 
advancements in technology and communications have figuratively 
reduced the size of the World.381 Human interaction is different than 
at the time of the framing. The problems we deal with today are 
different from those dealt with in 1789, 1889, or even 1989. And they 
are different from problems that future generations will deal with in 
2089 or 2189. “[T]radition is a living thing.”382 Indeed, “[i]t is 
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was 
laid down in the time of Henry IV.”383 Justice Holmes’s logic has 
                                                                                                                  
379 Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
380 See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the infamous “decision of 1789.” 
381 See generally Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-
first Century 51–200 (1st updated and expanded ed. 2006) (discussing recent events that have 
figuratively “flattened the world,” such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the invention of the World 
Wide Web, and the proliferation of wireless technology). 
382 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
383 Holmes, supra note 1, at 469.  
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equal force with respect to the late eighteenth century.384 Writing in 
1789 to James Madison on the subject, Thomas Jefferson stated, “it 
may be proved that no society can make a perpetual constitution, or 
even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living 
generation.”385 
As a threshold matter, both principles must be applied with a sense 
of restraint and “a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and 
the patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to 
presume in favour of its validity, until its violation of the constitution 
is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.”386  
The first principle—candor—requires that history is not used as a 
“mask for decisions reached on other grounds.”387 But “[g]eneral 
propositions do not decide concrete cases.”388 Candor, as a general 
proposition, requires a judge to start at the beginning when looking at 
history without a conclusion already in mind. If the judge has 
predetermined on policy grounds what the disposition of a case 
should be, candor is a “fleeting inhabitant of fairyland.”389 It is 
dubious when half of the Court (and commentary) has one 
interpretation of words said or actions taken and the other half of the 
Court (and commentary) holds another usually diametrically opposite 
view. That alignment, which usually coincides with the ideological 
divide on the Court, may be the first clue that candor is lacking.  
The first question a reviewing court should ask is whether the 
action is incontrovertibly unprecedented. If not, the Court should not 
base its decision on one interpretation of the history. Disputed novelty 
should absolutely not presume invalidity. Truly disputed novelty—or 
history in general—should not play into the analytical equation at 
all.390 What happened in the past, when undisputed, is a “convenient 
                                                                                                                  
384 See Posner, supra note 18, at 580 (asserting that referring to ancient laws “isn’t 
fundamentally different from the belief held by a great many modern American lawyers, judges, 
and law professors that the answers to modern questions of constitutional law can be found in 
the text or background of the Constitution, a documentary palimpsest most of which was drafted 
more than two centuries ago”). 
385 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 1 The Republic of 
Letters: The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 1776–1826, at 634 
(James Morton Smith ed., 1995).  
386 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827); see also supra Part I.B.2 
(discussing judicial restraint).  
387 Posner, supra note 18, at 593.  
388 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
389 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
390 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954) (“This discussion and our own 
investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve 
the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive.”). 
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body of relevant data.”391 But when the question is what did not 
happen in the past, there is danger that the pages of history will be 
narrowed and contorted to support a decision based on other grounds. 
Candor on the Court must transcend ideology.  
The second principle—consistency—builds on the first. Candor 
must be present for any standard to be consistently applied.  
Consistency requires Courts to first concretely ascertain the level 
of deference due to a challenged governmental action. Thus, a court 
should look at the basis upon which the action is challenged. This 
question looks directly at the rights involved and the constitutional 
principle in question. At bottom, and concededly oversimplified, there 
are three possible approaches: (1) presumed valid; (2) no 
presumption; and (3) presumed invalid. It is (or should be) a generally 
accepted principle that in a democratic society congressional actions 
are presumed valid.392 As Justice Stone instructed in Carolene 
Products, there are certain situations when that presumption takes a 
somewhat narrower scope.393 For example, when considering suspect 
classifications reviewed under strict scrutiny, the Court begins with a 
presumption of invalidity and the novelty of a given law is 
irrelevant.394  
The purpose of the first question is to determine where the analysis 
begins. The challengers to the individual mandate aver that Congress 
has exceeded its constitutional authority under the commerce 
power.395 When a challenger asserts that Congress has exceeded its 
commerce power, the challenged action is presumed valid.396 Thus, 
challenges to the individual mandate should begin in position one 
before the novelty of the act is assessed.  
Next, a reviewing court must ask two questions, candidly, and in 
sequence: (1) Is the action truly novel, in practice and historic intent 
or meaning?; and (2) If so, have “the conditions on which the practice 
depended . . . changed in a constitutionally relevant way?”397 If the 
                                                                                                                  
391 Posner, supra note 18, at 589.  
392 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
393 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting that 
there are certain situations where less deference to the majoritarian legislature is appropriate). 
394 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (quoting Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial classifications [imposed by 
government] … must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
395 The government also has attempted to defend the individual mandate as a tax; however, 
for purposes of this analysis, either provision of the constitution would yield the same outcome 
as the law is essentially regulatory in nature.  
396 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (citing cases) (“We need not determine 
whether respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce 
in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”). 
397 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 805 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). The relevant 
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action is not truly novel, the import of history was well stated by 
Judge Posner: “[I]t is the information itself that should shape our 
response to current problems, rather than the past as such; the past is 
just a data source.”398 Because all questions are a matter of degree, if 
there is genuine dispute about the novelty the Court should find that 
the history is inconclusive. What little evidence there is could, 
however, help illuminate the outcome.  
To elaborate on the middle ground, Printz is an example of what 
the Court should not do when the history is ambiguous.399 The 
majority found that the purported novelty of commandeering state and 
local executives elicited a presumption that the Brady Act was 
invalid.400 One interpretation of disputed history should not be so 
authoritative. For example, merely deeming Hamilton “the most 
expansive expositor of federal power” does not remove his statements 
from the history books.401 In a situation, such as in Printz, where the 
historical record is contradictory and ambiguous, the Court should not 
narrow and contort the facts to support a finding of novelty. What 
evidence there is should either be: (1) deemed inconclusive, which 
would not elicit any presumption; or (2) used as a data source, which 
depending on the information’s content could support or refute 
Congress’s assertion of power.  
For disputed history to help refute a power, the history must not be 
silence. Put differently, in the “middle ground,” where there is 
disagreement about what the history books say, any history used as a 
data source should be affirmative historical evidence, not silence or 
novelty. For example, if in Printz there where some statements that 
suggested commandeering was pernicious but that the historical 
record was still ambiguous, those statements could have been used to 
increase judicial skepticism of the Brady Act.  
                                                                                                                  
 
“condition” Justice Souter refers to in Alden is the principle that Congress may not infringe on 
traditional areas of state sovereignty using the commerce power. Id. at 806 (“Today . . . in light 
of Garcia, the law is settled that federal legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause may 
bind the States without having to satisfy a test of undue incursion into state sovereignty.”) 
(citation omitted). With Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 
(1985), on the books, that test is no longer applicable and state sovereignty concerns are taken 
care of by the political process. Thus, “the dearth of prior private federal claims entertained 
against the States in state courts does not tell us anything, and reflects nothing but an earlier and 
less expansive application of the commerce power.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 806.  
398 Posner, supra note 18, at 589.  
399 See supra Part II.B for a discussion of Printz.  
400 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (finding that the novelty of the act 
“tend[ed] to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted” to exist in the case). 
401 Id. at 915 n.9. 
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If the governmental action is undisputedly novel, a second query is 
warranted. Is there a reason—social, technological, political, or 
legal—that Congress has not taken the action in the past402 and has 
Congress rationally concluded that the action is now necessary? If 
both questions are answered in the affirmative, then the base 
presumption regarding the action should not change. For example, in 
Printz Congress passed “[t]he Brady Act . . . in response to what 
Congress described as an ‘epidemic of gun violence.’”403 The 
temporary time period of the Act also illustrates its practical nature. 
Even if the Brady Act was truly novel, the presumption of validity 
should not have changed.  
This is not to say that every law passed can merely include a 
congressional finding that “society has changed, and so we needed to 
do this” to be held constitutional. That would eviscerate any true 
consideration of the law’s constitutionality. Even in the “new era” of 
the Commerce Clause jurisprudence404 the scope of the federal 
government’s power continues to be enumerated unless and until a 
police power amendment is added to alter Article I, section 8. The 
only significance of the question is to determine the weight that the 
novelty of the action receives in the analytical equation. Even if 
Congress rationally advances a reason for the novelty and shows a 
compelling need, the action may nonetheless lie beyond its reach. 
But, if Congress does rationally advance a reason, or such a reason is 
apparent, then novelty cannot be the basis of the Court’s decision to 
strike the act down.  
The foregoing discussion of a “standard” is meant to illustrate that 
the unprecedented argument is, in the majority of situations, not a 
very good one. Imagine, however, that Congress passed a law that 
required every person, who can afford it, to carry a smart phone with 
internet and email capabilities. The basis of this law could be that 
since Congress finds its members enjoy theirs; everyone ought to 
enjoy one. And this law would likely increase productivity, and 
therefore positively affect the economy. Congress has arguably never 
forced every citizen to purchase or keep an item relying on its 
commerce power.405 Despite the ambiguity of the actual historical 
                                                                                                                  
402 For example, the action was forbidden or impossible, it could not garner the votes, or 
there simply was no need.  
403 Id. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 103–344, at 9 (1993)).  
404 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.1, 16 (2004).  
405 Proponents of the individual mandate have asserted that there is nothing novel about a 
forced purchase requirement. See, e.g., Reply in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 
19–20, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 
2010) (No. 3:10–cv–91–RV/EMT), 2010 WL 3500155 (arguing that federal requirements 
targeting market participants to carry insurance are nothing new); Press Release, Ohio Attorney 
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question, assume that the hypothetical statute was a novel exercise of 
Congress’s commerce power. The unprecedented argument could 
alter the presumption of constitutionality because Congress cannot 
rationally assert a reason for the new exercise of its commerce 
power—enjoyment of new technology by its members does not 
suffice. On the other hand, in section 1501(a) of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act406 Congress made elaborate findings that the 
individual mandate is necessary to improve health care for all 
Americans.407 Such findings are entitled to respect by the judiciary, 
even if a particular judge’s subjective judgment—and a large portion 
of the country, or an entire political party that has since gained 
                                                                                                                  
 
Gen. Richard Cordray, Ohio Will Not Challenge Health Care Law (Mar., 29, 2010) (on file with 
author) (explaining that Congress forced Americans to purchase guns, ammunition and 
gunpowder to be prepared for military service).  
The government notes that it is not novel for Congress to require market participants to 
carry insurance. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(e) (2006) (borrowers in flood hazard areas); 30 
U.S.C. § 1257(f) (2006) (coal mine operators). The leap in logic, however, is that everyone who 
is alive is a participant in the health care market. On that point the Government claims that there 
is “[a]bundant empirical evidence [that] shows that nearly everyone consumes health care.” 
Reply in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 406, at 17. The government also 
avers that eminent domain is similar to the forced purchase of health care. Id. at 20. Those 
actions, though similar in a general sense, are not the same. The individual mandate forces all 
citizens to purchase insurance whether or not they intend to enter the market voluntarily.  
Former Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray asserted that the Second Militia Act of 
1792 “required many Americans to make an economic purchase of a gun, ammunition, 
gunpowder and a knapsack.” Press Release, supra note 406. The mistake Cordray made is that 
the power under which Congress acted was its power to raise and support armies, the nature of 
which is much different that the commerce power. 
Others have argued that a 1798 act “authorized the creation of a government operated 
marine hospital service and mandated that privately employed sailors be required to purchase 
health care insurance.” Rick Ungar, Congress Passes Socialized Medicine and Mandates Health 
Insurance—In 1798, Forbes, (Jan. 17, 2011, 9:08 PM), 
http://blogs.forbes.com/rickungar/2011/01/17/congress-passes-socialized-medicine-and-
mandates-health-insurance-in-1798/ (discussing the Act of July 16, 1798, ch. 77, 1 Stat. 605). 
All is true, except Ungar liberally uses the phrase “required to purchase.” The act taxed 
merchant ships coming into port, remitted the tax to the treasury, and the treasury spent the 
money to build hospitals and care for sick seaman. Act of July 16, 1798, ch. 77, 1 Stat. 605 §§ 
1–3. David Kopel on the Volokh Conspiracy noted as much: “The Act is a solid precedent for 
federal involvement in health care, and no precedent at all for a federal mandate to purchase 
private products.” David Kopel, An Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seamen, The 
Volokh Conspiracy, (Apr. 2, 2010, 6:24 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/04/02/an-act-for-the-
relief-of-sick-and-disabled-seamen/.  
Which side of the above dispute is correct is a question that needs to be assessed 
objectively by a historian. It is noteworthy that each commentator and politician referenced 
alleged the history books supported their predetermined position without regard to contradictory 
data or the context of the facts. This Note does not attempt to resolve the dispute, nor could it. 
The purpose of the above discussion is to show the ills of relying on novelty, one of which is the 
difficulty of being an objective reader of the history books, another of which is the contortion of 
historical facts when they are used as ammunition in a legal dispute.  
406 Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
407 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (West 2010). 
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popularity—is to the contrary. And because the findings are rational, 
the presumption of constitutionality should not diminish.  
Even a novel and unsupported exercise of power (e.g., the 
hypothetical cell phone law) should only operate to increase judicial 
skepticism, particularly if the law is regulatory in nature. True novelty 
of regulatory laws could increase judicial skepticism, but courts must 
accept rational justifications proffered by Congress. Even if the action 
is novel and Congress offers no rational reason for the novelty, a 
presumption of invalidity is unjustified.  
CONCLUSION 
Courts should resist the temptation to presume that novel actions 
are invalid. That position is analytically flawed and “resemble[s] . . . 
the Lochner era’s industrial due process.”408 When courts use history 
authoritatively, the history should be accurate. An accurate reading of 
history requires objectivity. The argument advanced in this Note was 
put best by Justice Holmes: “We must beware of the pitfall of 
antiquarianism, and must remember that for our purposes our only 
interest in the past is for the light it throws upon the present.”409 
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